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INTRODUCTION 
Local governments are facing unprecedented fiscal challenges 
across the country.  These challenges have forced many municipalities 
to examine insolvency1 and have subjected others to state-initiated 
fiscal control boards.2  In March 2011, The New York Times reported 
 
 1. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial 
Crisis, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 634, 646 (2008); see also In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 
280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009); In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1995); In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Michael A. 
Fletcher, Pa. Capital Files for Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2011, at A14 (dis-
cussing the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania filing for bankruptcy); Susanna Kim, 
Harrisburg Joins List of Cities Filing for Bankruptcy, ABC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2011/10/harrisburg-joins-list-of-cities-filing-for-
bankruptcy/ (noting that the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania is facing a $458 million 
in creditor claims); Mary Williams Walsh & Katie Zezima, Small City, Big Debt 
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at B1 (noting that the City of Central Falls 
Rhode Island filed for bankruptcy on August 1, 2011); City of Central Falls, UNITED 
STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, DRI, http://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/central% 
20falls.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 2. The Financial Emergency Act of 1975 established the New York City Finan-
cial Control Board.  N.Y. Unconsol. §§ 5401–5420 (McKinney 1975); see also Gayle 
Gutekunst-Roth, New York—A City in Crisis: Fiscal Emergency Legislation and the 
Constitutional Attacks, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65, 72 (1977) (“The Emergency Act 
provides for a State Emergency Financial Control Board which wields review power 
over City operations and control over City funds to ensure that payment of debt ser-
vice obligations receives highest priority.”); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 3652 (McKinney 
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that states across the nation were planning severe budget cuts in aid 
to cities and other local governments.3  These cuts were expected to 
lead to more lay-offs, cuts in services, and increases in local taxes.4 
New York’s roughly 1600 municipalities and 10,000 special improve-
ment districts are no exception to these trends.5  For example, in the 
summer of 2011, Nassau County reported fiscal problems that were 
exacerbated by $43 million in increased labor costs for a county al-
ready under the watchful eye of a state fiscal oversight agency.6 
In 2006, then-State Comptroller Alan Hevesi began his annual re-
port on local governments with the ominous warning, “[l]ocal gov-
 
2011) (setting up the Nassau County Interim Finance Authority); N.Y. Pub. Auth. 
Law § 3850-a (McKinney 2011) (creating the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority in 
2003); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 3950-a (McKinney 2011) (creating the Erie County 
Fiscal Stability Authority in 2005).  The Act creating the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Au-
thority reads: “[t]he legislature hereby finds and declares that the city of Buffalo is 
facing a severe fiscal crisis, and that the crisis cannot be resolved absent assistance 
from the state. The legislature finds that the city has repeatedly relied on annual ex-
traordinary increases in state aid to balance its budget, and that the state cannot con-
tinue to take such extraordinary actions on the city’s behalf. The legislature further 
finds and declares that maintenance of a balanced budget by the city of Buffalo is a 
matter of overriding state concern, requiring the legislature to intervene to provide a 
means whereby: the long-term fiscal stability of the city will be assured, the confi-
dence of investors in the city’s bonds and notes is preserved, and the economy of 
both the region and the state as a whole is protected.” N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 3850-a 
(McKinney 2011).  The Erie County legislation uses similar language. N.Y. Pub. 
Auth. Law § 3950-a (McKinney 2011). 
 3. Michal Cooper, States Pass Budget Pain to Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/us/24cities.html (reporting that New York Gov-
ernor Andrew Cuomo decided against restoring $302 million in aid to the City of 
New York). 
 4. According to a recent report, there are 1607 general purpose local govern-
ments comprising of counties, cities, towns, and villages, which are governed by 
elected boards; 1811 special purpose local governments such as school, fire, and li-
brary districts, which are able “to impose taxes and/or issue debt directly or through 
another local government;” 1302 “other governmental entities” that include special 
purpose units (BOCES, community colleges, consolidated health districts) as well as 
public authorities, and thousands of special improvement districts organized pursuant 
to N.Y. Town Law Arts. 12 and 12-A. See New York Commission on Local Govern-
ment Efficiency and Competitiveness, 21st Century Local Government 10 (April 
2008), available at http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/LGEC_Final_Report.pdf?pagemo 
de=bookmarks.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Robert Brodsky, Union Cuts Pose a $115M Hurdle for Nassau, NEWSDAY 
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/union-costs-pose-115m-
hurdle-for-nassau-1.3099363 (reporting that labor costs will continue to rise every 
year through 2015 when all five labor union contracts are up for negotiation.). 
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ernments across New York operate amid evidence of mounting fiscal 
stress . . . .”7  A year later, Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli warned, 
Recent economic developments at the national, state and regional 
levels make this year’s annual report on the state of New York’s lo-
cal governments a cautionary tale . . . . These signs point to slower 
revenue growth for local governments, potentially less State aid, and 
increased pressures on the revenue of last resort—the property 
tax . . . . This sobering news comes at a time when local governments 
already face a host of other fiscal pressures: growing debt burdens, 
new federal and state mandates, rising health care costs for active 
employees and retirees, and (particularly for schools) higher expec-
tations for performance.8 
Another piece of legislation that further exacerbates the grim local 
fiscal situation in New York is the recently enacted local property tax 
cap.9  Some view the cap as a way to control local spending or as a 
method of ensuring that local residents do not have to fear tax bills 
out of line with inflation.  Others consider the tax cap a significant 
burden on local officials who must balance the paradigm of paying for 
federally and state mandated programs with the expectations for lo-
cally developed and delivered programs and services unique to each 
community.  In his 2010 Report on Local Governments, Comptroller 
DiNapoli cautioned generally: 
The road to recovery for State and local government finances will 
likely be a long and difficult one. In particular, school districts and 
counties face the expiration of federal stimulus funds at a time when 
State and local revenue growth will not be adequate to make up for 
the loss of federal dollars. Difficult decisions regarding spending and 
program levels loom ahead.10 
Exactly how to accomplish this feat in a political system where lo-
cal elected officials often desire to be re-elected and where the laws 
do not require meaningful public engagement in local fiscal decision 
making, presents a major challenge. 
 
 7. Alan Hevesi, 2006 Annual Report on Local Governments, OFFICE OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, at 3, available at http://osc.state.ny.us/localgov/ 
datanstat/annreport/06annreport.pdf. 
 8. Thomas DiNapoli, 2007 Annual Reports on Local Governments, OFFICE OF 
THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, at 3, available at http://osc.state.ny.us/localgov 
/datanstat/annreport/07annreport.pdf. 
 9. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 3-c (McKinney 2011).  
 10. Thomas DiNapoli, 2010 Annual Reports on Local Governments, OFFICE OF 
THE STATE COMPTROLLER, at 3, available at http://osc.state.ny.us/localgov/datanstat/ 
annreport/10annreport.pdf. 
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Part I of this Article discusses many of the factors contributing to 
the fiscal crisis at the local level in New York including historic de-
creases in federal and state revenue sharing, the imposition of a new 
property tax cap, the failure of New York to address meaningfully the 
subject of unfunded mandates on local governments, and the depend-
ency of some local jurisdictions on the timely adoption of a state 
budget.  Part II discusses concepts of deliberative democracy and how 
local residents might be engaged to become partners with local offi-
cials in making difficult fiscal decisions that impact all community res-
idents.  Public polling, participatory budgeting, collaborative decision 
making, and citizen advisory committees are all examples of models 
promoted as methods for enhancing civil discourse and public en-
gagement in helping to set local fiscal priorities. The Article con-
cludes in Part III with a recognition that “business as usual” in New 
York is simply not sustainable and that while the state must do its 
part to ease some of the fiscal burdens, local government officials 
must return to the people who put them in office to seek more fre-
quent input in an organized and methodical manner by employing 
one or more of the deliberative democracy techniques discussed in 
Part II. 
I.  KEY CONTRIBUTORS TO THE CURRENT FISCAL CRISIS 
Local governments in fiscal crises are not new in New York.11  In 
the 1970s, the State intervened to rescue New York City,12 which was 
on the brink of disastrous bankruptcy.13  Since then, six municipalities 
 
 11. See Joel E. Cohen, The Limits of State Intervention in a Municipal Fiscal Cri-
sis, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1976) (explaining that, at the time of publication, mu-
nicipal fiscal crises were becoming more frequent). 
 12. See Gutekunst-Roth, supra note 2, at 72 (discussing the three methods of state 
intervention that were forced upon the failing New York City finances).  First, the 
Stabilization Reserve Corporation (SRC) was enacted by the New York State legisla-
ture in 1974 to create capital for New York City expenses. Id. at 66.  Secondly, Mu-
nicipal Assistance Corporations were created by the 1975 legislature with a similar 
purpose to the proper SRCs. Id. at 68–69.  Finally, the State passed the Financial 
Emergency Act which set up a Financial Control Board to review the City’s opera-
tions and funds to make certain that debts were paid. Id. at 72. 
 13. Roy Bahl & William Duncombe, Economic Change and Fiscal Planning: The 
Origins of the Fiscal Crisis in New York State, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547 (1992); see 
also WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN FIS-
CAL CRISIS, 2–5, 24 (1982) (explaining that the cause of the New York City fiscal cri-
sis was a complex mixture of many factors including capital borrowing, high interest 
rates from banks, high revenue estimates, increased spending during a time of finan-
cial worry, and the combination of a “post-industrial economy” coupled with a “pre-
industrial population”). 
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in the state have been subject to state fiscal control boards.14  The 
power to tax is vested in the State Legislature, and the Legislature 
may grant to counties and cities the limited power to raise revenue 
through taxation.15  Many believe that the fiscal crisis is due to a com-
bination of factors: rising municipal costs and limited ability to raise 
revenue to pay for these costs.16  The structure of local government in 
New York has also been under attack as being too complex, overlap-
ping, inefficient, and costly.17 At the core of these problems, however, 
 
 14. See statutes cited supra note 2; see also Financial Emergency Act of 1984 for 
the City of Yonkers, 1984 N.Y. Laws 1632.  Yonkers also experienced the control of a 
state financial board in 1975 as a result of its fiscal instability. See JOSEPH F. 
ZIMMERMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF NEW YORK STATE 34–35 (2d ed. 
2008).  The Comptroller now oversees fiscal issues in Yonkers pursuant to the Fiscal 
Agent Act. 1976 N.Y. Laws 1.  Furthermore, in New York City, there still exists a 
Municipal Assistance Corporation, pursuant to N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 3031–3032 
(McKinney 1990), with appointed officials on its nine member control board that is-
sues bonds and notes to help the city’s finances. See ZIMMERMAN, supra, at 34.  The 
City of Troy is also subjected to the oversight and assistance of a municipal assistance 
corporation. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 3051–3053 (McKinney 2003).  In addition, the 
Troy Supervisory Board has the powers to oversee the city. See 1994 N.Y. Laws 3669.  
 15. See N.Y. CONST. art. 16 § 1 (“The power of taxation shall never be surren-
dered, suspended or contracted away, except as to securities issued for public pur-
poses pursuant to law. Any laws which delegate the taxing power shall specify the 
types of taxes which may be imposed thereunder and provide for their review. Ex-
emptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be al-
tered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used exclusively 
for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any 
corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of 
such purposes and not operating for profit.”); see also Sonmax, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 392 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Co. 1977), aff’d 372 N.E.2d 9 (1977) (“It is well settled 
that all taxing power in the State of New York is granted to the Legislature pursuant 
to [Articles 3, § 1 and 16, § 1 of the State Constitution.]  However, the State may del-
egate to the county or city the power to assess and collect taxes.”) (citations omitted).   
 16. Congressional Budget Office, Fiscal Stress Faced by Local Governments, at 2 
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12005/12-09-Municipalities_ 
Brief.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., A New N.Y.: A Blueprint to Reform Government, NEW YORK 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://www.reformnygov.com/for_citizens.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2012). As Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo proposed and pushed for 
the ultimate enactment of the New York Government Reorganization and Citizen 
Empowerment Act.  The law is designed to allow citizens to take an active role in 
calling for municipal consolidation.  The act allows two or more local governments to 
consolidate their local governments into one entity.  The consolidation can be initiat-
ed by either one of two ways: (1) joint resolution by both local governments, or (2) 
through an elector initiative. See Press Release, Attorney General Cuomo Unveils 
Landmark Government Consolidation Legislation (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/may/may21b_09.html; see also N.Y. Gen. 
Mun. Law § 751.  If the consolidating entities are villages and towns, then there is a 
requirement that the two localities be contiguous. Id.  Further, the Act only applies to 
town, village, district, special improvement district, or other improvement districts, 
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rests the roots of federalism. Should the federal and state govern-
ments continue to mandate cost-sharing by local governments for ser-
vices and programs that are developed and controlled at the federal 
and state levels, and can and should local governments count on fiscal 
assistance from the federal and state governments to meet their obli-
gations to support local residents (including funding mandated pro-
grams and services)? 
A. Typical Municipal Expenditures in New York 
One cause of local fiscal stress is the long list of expected services 
on which a locality must expend its resources to maintain a well-
functioning local government.  The Office of the New York State 
Comptroller has identified eight function service categories of local 
government expenditures (not including New York City).18  In 2008, 
the largest service expenditure was for education, which amounted to 
30% of local government spending.19  The second largest categories 
were general government services and employee benefits, each of 
which accounted for 16% of local government spending.20  Other ser-
vices, in the order of resources spent, included public safety, debt ser-
vice, transportation, and sanitation and utilities.21 
Data from the State Comptroller’s Office reveals that from 1998 to 
2008 expenditures for counties increased on an annual basis by 
4.55%.22  From 2004 to 2009 the total amount of county expenditures 
increased by $4,422,239,080.23  Social services have been identified as 
the major expenditures for county governments, representing 26% of 
 
but it does not apply to school districts, city districts, or special purpose districts cre-
ated by counties under the N.Y. County Law. Id. 
 18. New York Dep’t of State, Local Gov’t Efficiency Program Ann. Rep. 2009–
2010, at 4, available at http://www.dos.state.ny.us/lg/publications/LGEannualreport 
SFY09.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. Local government expenditures were as follows in 2008 (excluding New 
York City General Government): services represented 16%, education represented 
30%, public safety represented 8%, transportation 5%, sanitation and utilities 4%, 
other functions 14%, employee benefits 16%, and debt services 7%. 
 22. New York State Office of the State Comptroller, 2010 Ann. Rep. on Local 
Gov’s, at 28, available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/datanstat/annreport/10 
annreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Ann. Rep]. 
 23. Search Local Government Spending, OPEN BOOK NEW YORK, http://wwe1. 
osc.state.ny.us/transparency/LocalGov/localgovintro.cfm (choose “Trend,” check 
“Expenditures,” submit, then search all counties in all categories for 2004 and 2009) 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
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local spending.24  For a decade, starting in 1998, towns experienced an 
annual increase in their expenditures of 5.2%.25  Also, from 2004 to 
2009, the average annual expenditure by town governments was 
$956,784,818.26  Transportation was the leading local government ex-
penditure by towns, accounting for up to 22% of all spending, which 
increased annually by 5%.27  Sanitation, public safety, and employee 
benefits also made up a large portion of town expenditures.28  Villag-
es experienced an annual increase in their expenditures by 4.7% from 
1998 to 2008.29  From 2005 to 2010, increases in village expenditures 
totaled $67,639,969.30  For villages, public safety represents the largest 
category of expenditure at 21%.31   
Lastly, cities (excluding New York City) during 1998 to 2008 expe-
rienced an annual expenditure increase of 4%.32  City expenditures 
from 2004 to 2009 increased by $722,475,073.33  As with other levels of 
government, from 1998 to 2009, public safety was the largest city ex-
penditure.34  Cities, out of all local governments, are most dependent 
on state aid, and when this source of revenue is reduced, it places a 
large strain on city governments.35  Absent structural changes, the 
cost of these services can be expected to rise over time.  Federal and 
state aid has traditionally been a source of revenue for local govern-
ments.  In tough economic times, however, this expectation must 
change.  State and federal governments no longer have the resources 
 
 24. 2010 Ann. Rep., supra note 22, at 28. 
 25. Id. at 32. 
 26. Search Local Government Spending, OPEN BOOK NEW YORK, http://wwe1. 
osc.state.ny.us/transparency/LocalGov/localgovintro.cfm (choose “Trend,” check 
“Expenditures,” submit, then search all towns in all categories for 2004 and 2009) 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 27. 2010 Ann. Rep., supra note 22, at 32. 
 28. Congressional Budget Office, supra note 16, at 2. 
 29. 2010 Ann. Rep., supra note 22, at 34. 
 30. Search Local Government Spending, OPEN BOOK NEW YORK, http://wwe1. 
osc.state.ny.us/transparency/LocalGov/localgovintro.cfm (choose “Trend,” check 
“Expenditures,” submit, then search all villages in all categories for 2005 and 2010) 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 31. 2010 Ann. Rep., supra note 22, at 34. 
 32. Id. at 30. 
 33. Search Local Government Spending, OPEN BOOK NEW YORK, http://wwe1. 
osc.state.ny.us/transparency/LocalGov/localgovintro.cfm (choose “Trend,” check 
“Expenditures,” submit, then search all cities in all categories for 2004 and 2009) (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 34. 2010 Ann. Rep., supra note 22, at 31. 
 35. Id. at 30. 
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to aid local governments sufficiently to ease the local burden for the 
rising costs of these services. 
B. Fiscal Federalism: The Federal Fiscal Relationship with 
Local Governments 
The theory of federalism is based upon the principle of “shared 
governance” between the three different layers of government: na-
tional, state, and local.36  Shared governance reflects a partnership 
with the federal and state governments that constantly changes ac-
cording to national policies and priorities.37  An integral part of this 
theory is the financial assistance38 that the federal government dis-
tributes to the state and local governments, embracing a top-down 
approach to financing the lower levels of government.39  Fiscal feder-
alism decentralizes the government, creating a “vertical structure” of 
governance.40  This vertical structure allows for the national govern-
ment to assign programs and functions to lower levels of government 
while supporting these programs by funding the lower level govern-
ments accordingly.41  In effect, this financial assistance transfers the 
policies that are created at the national and state level to the local 
governments for implementation.42 
Fiscal federalism is seen as an efficient process as it allows for larg-
er governmental policies to be tailored to different local interests 
across many jurisdictions.43  Scholars note that, “[a] core principle in 
fiscal federalism theory is a purist view of public-sector functions: 
government steps in where the private market system fails, and ‘gov-
ernment agencies, as ‘custodians of the public interest’ . . . seek to 
maximize social welfare.’”44  Often these services come in the form of 
grant-in-aid programs that create a “partnership between the federal 
government and the states, a collaboration of shared finances and 
 
 36. Daniel L. Hatcher, Property Revenue: The Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 682 (2010). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 683. 
 39. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE 
GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 114–15 (2nd ed. 2008). 
 40. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE 1120 (1999). 
 41. Id. at 1121. 
 42. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2550 
(2005) (discussing three models of fiscal federalism: the contemporary model, the su-
perior capacity model, and the leadership model). 
 43. Hatcher, supra note 36, at 684. 
 44. Id. 
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governance intended to increase services and programs for those in 
need of assistance.”45  Overall, the fiscal federalism approach and the 
resulting decentralized vertical structure of government allow the 
federal government to address certain regional needs.46  Fiscal feder-
alism does not come without limits, however.  The theory allows local 
governments to tax for spending on services that are within the dis-
cretion of the local government, but it does not allow the local gov-
ernment to use federal support to finance discretionary agendas.47 
1. The Decline of Federal and Local Municipal Revenue Sharing 
Programs 
Revenue sharing was introduced during the Nixon Administration 
when Congress passed the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 
1972.48  It allowed for intergovernmental capital distribution from the 
national government to state and local governments without man-
dates for spending the funds.49  Local government could spend the 
funds for any non-discriminatory, legal purpose.50  Revenue sharing 
was, “designed to relieve tax shortages, develop local self-sufficiency, 
create a better tax system, equalize the fiscal capabilities of each state, 
and encourage the development of new revenue resources at the state 
and local level.”51  In effect, the main purpose of revenue sharing was 
to aid local governments in recovering from their financial hard-
ships.52  At the time, revenue sharing was an efficient way for the na-
tional government to distribute collected taxes to lower level gov-
ernments because taxing at the local level had been proven to be 
 
 45. Id. at 681. 
 46. Id. at 689. 
 47. Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in 
an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 555 (2010). 
 48. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 
(1972); Duance A. Martin, The President and the Cities: Clinton’s Urban Aid Agen-
da, 26 URB. LAW. 99, 103 (1994).  Under the 1972 Act, “Congress  appropriated 30.2 
billion to be given to the fifty states and approximately 38,000 general purpose local 
governments over a five-year period with few attached conditions.” ZIMMERMAN, su-
pra note 39, at 125. 
 49. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis The States: The 
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1569 (1977). 
 50. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 103, 86 
Stat. 919 (1972); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39, at 125. 
 51. Martin, supra note 48, at 103 (quoting Robert H. Freilich, Current Develop-
ments in Local Government Law—A Review of Recent Decisions, Statutes, and 
Events, and Their Impact in the Field of Urban Law, 6 URB. LAW. 288, 290 (1974)). 
 52. Choper, supra note 49, at 1569. 
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more “regressive” than at the national level.53  Therefore, revenue 
sharing was a vehicle to balance out the taxing inequity between the 
different levels of government by transferring the funds uncondition-
ally.54 
Although the 1972 Act was popular with the states and local gov-
ernments because of its “no strings attached” funding,55 the Reagan 
Administration sought to lessen taxes and government spending, 
providing for economic growth through the private markets.56  With 
this principle in mind, Reagan sought to enhance decision making at 
the local level with regard to public services with less federal in-
volvement.57  To accomplish these goals, Reagan abolished the gen-
eral revenue scheme that had provided substantial and unconditional 
financial support to local governments.58  As of 1980, the revenue 
sharing scheme had endowed local governments with $10.8 billion in 
direct financial assistance and $1.75 billion to cities with populations 
exceeding 300,000.59  President Reagan deserted the revenue sharing 
scheme while in office, and the effects where notable.60  While the 
scheme was in place in 1980, federal dollars represented 14.3% of the 
cities’ budget.61  In 1992, however, without a revenue sharing pro-
gram, federal dollars added up to less than 5% of cities’ budgets.62  
This reallocation of funds forced local governments to cut spending 
drastically and to seek the little state aid that was available.63  These 
statistics illustrate how cuts in federal aid to municipalities have the 
ability to induce financial crisis in a local government.  For instance, if 
federal aid had not been lessened by the elimination of revenue shar-
ing, then New York City might have been able to avoid the budget 
crises in 1990 and 1991.64 
 
 53. Oates, supra note 40, at 1128. 
 54. Id. 
 55. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 39, at 124–25. 
 56. Martin, supra note 48, at 111. 
 57. Id. at 112. 
 58. Peter Dreier, Americans Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 1351, 1384  (1993). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Demetrios Caraley, Washington Abandons the Cities, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1–30 
(1992).  During 1989 and into the early 1990s the northeast experienced an economic 
rescission that was exacerbated by these cuts in federal aid to cities.  In 1980, 52% of 
New York City’s general spending was funded by federal aid.  This number dramati-
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2. Decrease in Federal Support Creates a Strain on Local 
Governments to Balance Their Budgets 
When federal funding to states and local governments is either di-
minished or comes to an end, it places a strain on local governments 
to balance their budgets.65  The uncertainty of federal support be-
comes an annual concern because state and local governments must 
balance their budgets yearly, basing their decisions on the amount of 
anticipated federal aid.66  While the federal government typically 
frames budget cuts as a “shared sacrifice,” local governments tend to 
suffer more with cuts to grants and aid programs where they are left 
to make up the shortfall from decreased federal aid.67  For example, 
when the federal budget is cut by 5%, the effect on local governments 
may result in a loss of 20% of grants and federal aid.68  This is be-
cause, as one scholar explains, when the federal government makes 
budget cuts it often involves policies and services that are related to 
the functionality of local governments.69  Further, federal policies and 
services are less susceptible or even immune to federal budget cuts.70  
This disparity creates an adverse effect on local governments because 
their budgets are more vulnerable to a decrease in federal spending. 71 
A current example of another potential crisis looming is the end of 
the federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 
State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2011–12 which will force local governments 
to again rebalance their already strapped budgets.72  The ARRA 
 
cally dropped to 32% in 1989 partly from the elimination of revenue sharing.  As a 
result, New York City was forced to cut $4 billion from its budget leading to a finan-
cial crisis in both 1990 and 1991 due to trouble balancing its budget without the relied 
upon federal aid. Id. 
 65. Office of the New York State Comptroller, Division of Local Government 
and School Accountability, 2010 Ann. Rep. on Local Governments, at 16, available at 
http://syracusecoe.org/EFC/images/allmedia/LIBRARYcapitalplanning.pdf.  A con-
cern arises when the federal government has yet to create a budget outlining funding 
to local governments, then the locality cannot implement the federal changes into its 
financial plans. Super, supra note 42, at 2591–92. 
 66. See J. Edwin Benton, The Effects of Changes in Federal Aid on State and Lo-
cal Government Spending, 22 PUBLIUS 71, 71–82 (1992). 
 67. Super, supra note 42, at 2591. 
 68. Id. at 2591–92. 
 69. Id. at 2591. 
 70. Id. (noting that such services include, military, national debt, long term leases, 
et cetera). 
 71. Id. 
 72. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009); see also Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, REPORT ON THE 
STATE FISCAL YEAR 2010–11 ENACTED BUDGET, at 14, available at http://www.osc. 
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sought to stimulate the economy through infrastructure growth and 
investment.73  In New York alone the ARRA provided $500 million 
for water and sewer infrastructure work and $1.1 billion for roads and 
highways.74  The state government passed through a large portion of 
the ARRA funding to the local governments: in SFY 2010–11, local 
governments received $4.9 billion, and in SFY 2008–09 and 2009–10 
local governments received $2.7 billion.75  These funds provided sig-
nificant resources to support local government services and priorities 
consistent with the purposes of the ARRA. 
C. New York State’s Fiscal Relationship with Local 
Governments 
Commonly, municipalities are viewed as the “direct link” between 
state policies and their application to New York residents.76  As pre-
viously noted, local governments are “creatures of the state” and 
therefore possess only the powers and authorities that the state con-
stitution and various statutes grant them.77  In New York, “the State 
 
state.ny.us/reports/budget/2011/2010-11enactedbudgetreport.pdf (stating that federal 
stimulus money as a result of the ARRA is not expected to be received for the SFY 
of 2012–13). 
 73. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
3(a)(1-5), 123 Stat. 115, 115 (2009). 
 74. Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, Division of Local Government and 
School Accountability, Research Brief: Cracks in the Foundation: Local Government 
Infrastructure and Capital Planning Needs, at 2, available at http://syracusecoe.org/ 
EFC/images/allmedia/LIBRARYcapitalplanning.pdf. 
 75. Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, REPORT ON THE STATE FISCAL YEAR 
2010–11 ENACTED BUDGET, at 14, available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/ 
budget/2011/2010-11enactedbudgetreport.pdf.  These funds were primarily used for 
general budget relief for local governments and tax cuts. See Dean Skelos et al., New 
York State Economic Review SFY 2011–2012, 11–14 (2011) available at http://www. 
nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/2011_SFC_Majority_Revenue_Forecast_Report.pdf. 
 76. See 2011 Mandate Relief Redesign Team, Preliminary Report, Putting the 
Brakes on Unfunded Mandates: A New State-Local Partnership: A Report to the 
Governor of Findings and Proposals § I (2011), available at http://www.governor.ny. 
gov/assets/documents/finalmandate.pdf [hereinafter Unfunded Mandates]. 
 77. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907); see also Kimhi, 
supra note 1, at 634, 664; New York Dep’t of State, Local Government Handbook, 
29–38 (2009), available at http://www.dos.state.ny.us/lg/publications/Local_Governm 
ent_Handbook.pdf [hereinafter Local Government Handbook].  Article IX of the 
State Constitution required the State Legislature to enact a “Statute of Local Gov-
ernments” in order to grant certain powers to local governments. The granted powers 
include the power to: adopt ordinances, resolutions, rules and regulations; acquire 
real and personal property; acquire, establish and maintain recreational facilities; fix, 
levy and collect charges and fees; and in the case of a city, town or village, to adopt 
zoning regulations and conduct comprehensive planning. Id. 
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relies on its municipalities and school districts to deliver vital services 
to its residents and often prescribes exactly how these services should 
be provided.  This limits flexibility and increases costs.”78  The fiscal 
health of local government is also tied to the state budget, and when 
the state budget is late it can impair some local governments’ ability 
to create an effective financial plan.79  Article VII of the State Consti-
tution requires the Governor to prepare the state budget and charges 
the Senate and Assembly with the duty to review it.80  While the most 
recent New York State budget was approved on time,81 in previous 
years, it was not uncommon for the state budget to be delayed, some-
times for up to five months.82  The best example of the havoc that de-
layed state budgets cause is the impact on local school district budg-
ets, which must be approved in May without knowing state aid 
amounts, a major source of their funding.83 
Three major aspects of the state and local government fiscal rela-
tionship in New York—state aid to municipalities, property tax and 
 
 78. Unfunded Mandates, supra note 76, § I. 
 79. Office of the New York State Comptroller, Local Gov’t Snapshot, State 
Budget Delay: Impact on Local Governments and School Districts, at 1 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/snapshot/0510snapshot.pdf 
[hereinafter Local Government Snapshot].  The State fiscal year begins April 1, yet 
the majority of local government budgets are on the calendar fiscal year (beginning 
January 1).  By statute, Towns must prepare their budgets by November, Villages are 
authorized to select one of three different fiscal years, and city fiscal years are set in 
their charters. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 109(a) (McKinney 2004); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 
5-510 (McKinney 2010); see also Office of State Comptroller, Citizens’ Guide to Lo-
cal Budgets, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/releases 
/LocalBudgetGuide2010.pdf [hereinafter Guide to Local Budgets]. 
 80. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII §§ 1–3 (“Annually, on or before the first day of Feb-
ruary in each year following the year fixed by the constitution for the election of gov-
ernor and lieutenant governor, and on or before the second Tuesday following the 
first day of the annual meeting of the legislature, in all other years, the governor shall 
submit to the legislature a budget containing a complete plan of expenditures pro-
posed to be made before the close of the ensuing fiscal year and all moneys and reve-
nues estimated to be available therefore, together with an explanation of the basis of 
such estimates and recommendations as to proposed legislation, if any, which the 
governor may deem necessary to provide moneys and revenues sufficient to meet 
such proposed expenditures. It shall also contain such other recommendations and 
information as the governor may deem proper and such additional information as 
may be required by law.”). 
 81. Thomas Kaplan, Despite Hecklers, Lawmakers Close in on Rare Early Budg-
et, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at A24 (“[O]nly six times since 1975 has the state 
passed a budget by the time March turned into April.”). 
 82. Danny Hakim, 125 Days Late, A State Budget With New Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2010, at A1 (discussing the trouble with passing the 2010 budget, which was 
passed on August 3, 2010); see Local Government Snapshot, supra note 79, at 1. 
 83. Local Government Snapshot, supra note 79, at 1. 
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mandate relief—are discussed below.  Each aspect has its own con-
tributing effect or impact on the fiscal crisis at the local level.  Similar 
to the decrease in federal aid, decreasing state aid to municipalities 
has the effect of straining the local budget because there is less reve-
nue and state aid may be unknown when formulating the local budget 
and accounting for expected revenue.84  Although New York munici-
palities have the power to tax property to raise revenue to support lo-
cal services, such action is constrained by the New York State Consti-
tution and further limited by the recent New York Property Tax Cap 
law, also discussed in detail below. Lastly, New York State has a his-
tory of encumbering the local budget with unfunded state mandates.  
Continued calls for reform, as described below, have yet to produce 
meaningful fiscal relief for local governments. 
1. State Aid to Municipalities 
State fiscal assistance to local governments is a major component 
of local finances.85  For example, in 2005 state aid represented one-
quarter of local government revenue.86  Within the state budget, the 
Governor allocates support for local governments through the Aid 
and Incentives for Municipalities (AIM) program.87  The AIM pro-
gram provides for “the payment of general purpose local government 
aid for the support of local government for state fiscal years . . . [and] 
shall be paid from an appropriation made for the aid and incentives 
for municipalities program pursuant to the public protection and gen-
eral government budget for such state fiscal years. . . .”88  The AIM 
program was created in 2005 and 2006 and had the effect of increasing 
“unrestricted aid” to localities by $57 million.89  From 2007 to 2008, 
 
 84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Congressional Budget Of-
fice, Fiscal Stress Faced by Local Governments, at 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12005/12-09-Municipalities_Brief.pdf. 
 85. Local Government Handbook, supra note 77, at 103; see New York Confer-
ence of Mayors, Connecting the Dots: A Blue Print for Revitalizing Our Communi-
ties and Our State, at 6 (2006), available at http://www.nycom.org/documents/ 
ConnectingDots.pdf (demonstrating a trend of rising local government revenues and 
decreasing state aid, creating a strain on local government financing). 
 86. Local Government Handbook, supra note 77, at 103. 
 87. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54(10) (McKinney 2011). 
 88. Id.  For the appropriation bill that sets out the budget from the state to aid 
local governments, see N.Y. Bill S.2803/A4003 (2011), available at http://publications. 
budget.ny.gov/eBudget1112/fy1112appropbills/Local.pdf. 
 89. Local Government Handbook, supra note 77, at 103; see David A. Paterson, 
2010–2011 Executive Budget Briefing Book, available at http://www.budget.ny.gov/ 
pubs/archive/fy1011archive/eBudget1011/fy1011littlebook/BriefingBook.pdf. 
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the Enacted Budget restructured the AIM program, allowing for 
more aid to municipalities experiencing a financial crisis.90  These in-
creases were aimed at helping with improved accountability require-
ments and encouraging shared services programs and merger and 
consolidations.91  Due to the economic environment, however, the 
Enacted Budget for the SFY of 2011–12 has reduced the AIM pro-
gram funding by 2% from the 2010–11 Enacted Budget, resulting in a 
decrease of $14.6 million dollars.92 
State statutes set out budgeting standards for counties, villages, and 
towns.93  In cities, budgeting standards are typically contained in the 
city charter.94  A local government’s budget details projected expendi-
tures and revenues.95  One of the revenues accounted for in the local 
budget is, “payments from other governments in the form of grants-
in-aid.”96  State Aid programs are funded to certain local govern-
ments through the general government fund, “reflecting all expendi-
tures made for local assistance.”97  Local governments are able to 
budget more accurately when there is certainty in the process for 
awarding of State Aid.98 
2. Municipal Power to Tax 
While New York municipalities have the power to collect property 
taxes, the state retains the original power to assess and collect the 
property tax.99  Within a municipality there are taxing units and as-
 
 90. Local Government Handbook, supra note 77, at 103. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Thomas P. DiNapoli, Report on the State Fiscal Year 2011-12 Enacted 
Budget at 50 (2011), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/budget/2011/2011 
_enactedbudgetreport_0511.pdf.  For a breakdown of the aid to each municipality 
and the decrease since the 2010-11 Enacted Budget, see Division of Budget, 2011–12 
Executive Budget Aid and Incentives for Municipalities (2011), available at http:// 
publications.budget.ny.gov/eBudget1112/fy1112localities/local/1112AidforMunicipali 
ties.pdf. 
 93. See N.Y. COUNTY LAW §§ 354–60; N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 102–15; N.Y. VILLAGE 
LAW §§ 5-500 to 5-532. 
 94. Guide to Local Budgets, supra note 79, at 2.  
 95. Local Government Handbook, supra note 77, at 109. 
 96. Id. 
 97. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54 (McKinney 2010). 
 98. See Office of N.Y. State Comptroller, Understanding the Budget Process at 8 
(2011), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/lgmg/budgetprocess08. 
pdf. 
 99. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI; see also Steven V. Melnik & Daved S. Cenedella, Tax 
Assessment in New York State, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 427, 430 (2011). 
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sessing units.100  Assessing units estimate the value of the real proper-
ty within their jurisdiction for taxing purposes.101  Taxing units then 
use those assessments to calculate the tax upon the property owner in 
accordance with the value of their property as assessed,102 and the 
counties then levy the tax.103  Collected taxes support the finances of 
the local government and also support the local public schools.104  The 
State Legislature has oversight authority over the real property taxing 
scheme.105  The New York State Constitution sets limitations as to the 
amount of real property taxes that can be collected by some munici-
palities based upon the make-up of the local taxing unit.106  Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, the amount of revenue that is raised from real 
property taxes cannot exceed a certain percentage of the average val-
ue of all the taxable property within that taxing jurisdiction.107  Such 
percentages range from 1.5% to 2.5%.108 
Residents are already overburdened when it comes to property 
taxes in New York, as the state has the dubious distinction of local 
taxes amounting to 79% above the national average.109  Due to the 
 
 100. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI; see also Melnik & Cenedella, supra note 99, at 434. 
 101. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI; see also Melnik & Cenedella, supra note 99, at 434. 
 102. Melnik & Cenedella, supra note 99, at 434.  Each county in the State, through 
a board of supervisors and in accordance with the N.Y. Real Property Tax Law, lev-
ies taxes on real property within the county based on mandated valuation methods 
and property assessments provided by cities and towns within the county.  N.Y. REAL 
PROP. TAX LAW § 900 (McKinney 2010). 
 103. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 900. 
 104. Melnik & Cenedella, supra note 99, at 430. 
 105. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 202(1)(d)–(e); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 
301, 305. 
 106. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (stating that the percentage limits for the amount 
of real property taxes that can be collected are “(a) . . . any county, for county pur-
poses, one and one-half per centum; provided, however, that the legislature may pre-
scribe a method by which such limitation may be increased so as not to exceed two 
per centum; (b) any city of one hundred twenty-five thousand or more inhabitants 
according to the latest federal census, for city purposes, two per centum; (c) any city 
having less than one hundred twenty-five thousand inhabitants according to the latest 
federal census, for city purposes, two per centum; (d) any village, for village purpos-
es, two per centum; (e) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of this section, the city of New York and the counties therein, for city and county 
purposes, a combined total of two and one-half per centum.”)  It should be noted that 
within this constitutional provision there is no tax limit applicable to towns.  Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.; see Melnik & Cenedella, supra note 99, at 451. 
 109. New York State Commission on Property Tax Relief, A Preliminary Report 
of Findings and Recommendations to Gov. David A Paterson, at 13 (2008), available 
at http://blog.syracuse.com/indepth/2008/06/Suozzi%20report (citing Citizens Budget 
Commission, Local Taxes in New York State: Easing the Burden 9 (2007)). 
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limitations on local power to tax to generate  revenue, over the years 
municipalities have sought to charge fees, as opposed to taxes, as a 
source of revenue to pay for certain government services.  For exam-
ple, in the land development process, while certain fees, such as envi-
ronmental review fees and building permit fees are specifically au-
thorized by statute,110 other types of fees, such as impact fees, have 
not survived legal challenge absent specific authorization from the 
state legislature.111 
a. The Property Tax Cap of 2011 
On June 24, 2011, the New York legislature signed into law the 
property tax cap that places a limit on the amount of annual growth 
of property taxes that can be levied per year to the lesser of two per-
cent or the rate of inflation.112  The law applies to school districts, 
special districts, and all local governments except New York City.113  
The tax cap only limits the annual levy and does not limit the tax 
rate.114  Therefore, residents’ individual property taxes may increase 
by more than two percent annually even with the two percent levy 
limit.  Limited exclusions to the cap include tax levies for certain tort 
actions against the local government and certain pension increases.115  
 
 110. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.13 (2011) (authorizing the use 
of a fee applied to applicants during the State Environmental Quality Review Act 
process.); see also N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 2010). 
 111. See Patricia E. Salkin, Impact Fees for New York Municipalities: Time For 
Legislative Action?, at 38–48 (1991), available at http://www.governmentlaw.org/files/ 
impact_fees_ny_municipalities.pdf. 
 112. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch.97, § 1 (McKinney 2011); 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch.97, 
§ 2 (McKinney 2011); see also New York State Dep’t of Taxation and Finance, The 
Property Tax Cap Guidelines for Implementation, at 1 (2011), available at  
http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/orpts/capguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Tax Cap 
Guidelines].  Serious consideration of a tax cap began in January 2008 with Executive 
Order 22 issued by Governor Eliot Spitzer establishing the New York State Commis-
sion on Property Tax Relief.  The Commission was continued by Governor David 
Paterson pursuant to Executive Order 1 issued in March 2008. See New York State 
Commission on the Property Tax, Final Report to Governor David Paterson (Dec. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.cptr.state.ny.us/reports/CPTRFinalReport_20081201. 
pdf. 
 113. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch.97, § 1; see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, 
at 2. 
 114. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch.97, § 1; see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, 
at 2. 
 115. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch.97, § 1.  “Local governments can increase their prop-
erty tax levy beginning for fiscal year 2012 above the limit levy . . . for costs resulting 
from court orders or judgments against the local government arising out of tort action 
to be paid in the coming fiscal year.” Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, at 6.  The 
tort judgment must be above five percent of the total levy for the previous year. 2011 
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The fact that residents of many local governments may actually re-
ceive increases of more than two percent in their local property tax 
bills is not well understood by the public, most of whom are simply 
aware of the media sound bite “two percent tax cap.”116 
Perhaps the most significant and controversial aspect of the New 
York Property Tax Cap legislation is its override mechanism.  Local 
governments may override the levy limit by first enacting a local law 
for this purpose.117  The local law must be passed by a supermajority 
of the governing body within the local government.118  For a school 
district to override the cap, however, it requires 60% of the “voting 
power” for approval of the school budget.119  The public votes on a 
school district’s budget.120  Therefore, the public is the voting body 
with the authority to approve or disapprove the proposed school 
budget.  Because of this approach, an override law must have 60% of 
the governing body’s votes to be enacted, and because the governing 
body is the voting public, 60% of the voting public must agree to the 
override law.121  A local override law must be passed before the final 
budget is enacted.122 
 
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch.97, § 1.  Pension increases are excluded and occur when “the an-
nual growth in the average actuarial contribution rate for the Employee’s Retirement 
System (ERS), the Police and Fire Retirement System (PFRS), or the normal contri-
bution rate for Teacher Retirement System (TRS) exceeds two percentage points.” 
Id.   
 116. See generally N.Y. Office of State Comptroller, Local Government and 
School Accountability, Real Property Tax Cap Information, http://www.osc.state.ny. 
us/localgov/realprop/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
 117. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856 (McKinney 2011); see also Tax Cap Guidelines, su-
pra note 112, at 9. 
 118. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856 (“A local government may adopt a budget that re-
quires a tax levy that is greater than the tax levy limit for the coming fiscal year, not 
including any levy necessary to support the expenditures pursuant to subparagraphs 
(i) through (iv) of paragraph g of subdivision two of this section, only if the governing 
body of such local government first enacts, by a vote of sixty percent of the total vot-
ing power of such body, a local law to override such limit for such coming fiscal year 
only”); see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, at 9.  So, for example, if the leg-
islative body consists of five members, three legislators must vote in favor of the pro-
posed override.  This is because three votes out of the five possible is 60% of the leg-
islative body, the supermajority needed to enact the override legislation. 
 119. See 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856 (“[I]n the case of a district or fire district, a 
resolution, approved by a vote of sixty percent of the total voting power of such body, 
to override such limit for such coming fiscal year only.”); see also Tax Cap Guide-
lines, supra note 112, at 9. 
 120. N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 2023-a (McKinney 2011). 
 121. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856. 
 122. Id.; see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, at 9. 
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Adjustments to the tax cap can be made for municipalities that 
consolidate or dissolve.123 The law does not apply to newly created lo-
cal governments in the first fiscal year.124  Further, adjustments can be 
made for local governments who transfer functions.125  Local govern-
ment restructuring has long been touted by various State Administra-
tions as a way of reducing the local property tax burden.126  When 
these situations occur, it is the responsibility of the Office of the State 
Comptroller to adjust the tax levy for the upcoming fiscal year.127 
Local governments, already fiscally strapped due to federal and 
state mandates as well as the rising costs associated with public sector 
 
 123. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856 (“(a) When two or more local governments consol-
idate, the state comptroller shall determine the tax levy limit for the consolidated lo-
cal government for the first fiscal year following the consolidation based on the re-
spective tax levy limits of the component local governments that formed such 
consolidated local government from the last fiscal year prior to the consolidation. (b) 
When a local government dissolves, the state comptroller shall determine the tax levy 
limit for the local government that assumes the  debts, liabilities, and obligations of 
such dissolved local government  for the first fiscal year following the dissolution 
based on the respective tax levy limits of such dissolved local government and such 
local government that assumes the debts, liabilities, and obligations of such dissolved 
local government from the last fiscal year prior to the dissolution.”). 
 124. Id. (“The tax levy limit established by this section shall not apply to the first 
fiscal year after a local government is newly established or constituted through a pro-
cess other than consolidation or dissolution.”); see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra 
note 112, at 11–12. 
 125. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856; see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, at 12. 
 126. See Andrew Cuomo, Cap N.Y. Property Taxes The New, N.Y. Agenda 14 
(2010), available at http://www.andrewcuomo.com/system/storage/6/4a/5/1131/andrew 
_cuomo_cap_ny_property_taxes.pdf. 
 127. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856; see also Tax Cap Guidelines, supra note 112, at 
11–12.  For the consolidation of two or more local governments, “the Office of State 
Comptroller will calculate the tax levy limit for the first year after the consolidation.  
This calculation will be based upon the prior year tax levy limits of both local gov-
ernments, but other factors pertaining to the consolidation may also be considered.” 
Id. at 11.  For the transfer of functions from one local government to another local 
government, “the office of the State Comptroller shall determine the costs and sav-
ings of the associated function for both local governments.  This determination will 
be provided to the local governments so that the appropriate adjustments can be 
made to their tax levy limit calculations.” Id. at 12.  For dissolutions when one gov-
ernment completely dissolves,  
the Office of the State Comptroller will calculate the tax levy limit for the 
local government that assumes the debts, liabilities and obligations of the 
former local government.  This calculation will be based upon the prior year 
tax levy limits of both local governments, but other factors pertaining to the 
dissolution may also be considered. 
Id.  In the event that an entirely new local government is created the tax cap does not 
apply to the first fiscal year. Id. 
SALKIN & GOTTLIEB_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:24 AM 
2012] DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 747 
collective bargaining,128 are understandably concerned over the prop-
erty tax cap.  In response to questions about the override process, the 
New York Association of Towns has published a model override local 
law.129  Lewis County, along with other counties, requested that the 
Attorney General review the new tax cap law for constitutionality.130  
 
 128. The New York State constitution states that “[e]mployees shall have the right 
to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17.  Collective bargaining, however, has not transformed 
into a constitutional right. JEROME LEFKOWITZ, JEAN DOERR, & SHARON BERLIN, 
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.12 (2009).  That is to say, while 
the public employees have the right to organize and bargain collectively, the employ-
ers are not under such an obligation. Id.  New York’s collective bargaining law is 
called the Taylor Law and states that “[p]ublic employees shall have the right to 
form, join and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, 
any employee organization of their own choosing.” N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 202 
(McKinney 2010).  Further, such public employees share the right “to be represented 
by employee organizations, to negotiate collectively with their public employers in 
the determination of their terms and conditions of employment.” Id. § 203.  These 
laws are in place to protect public employees while in the negotiation process from 
employer interference. LEFKOWITZ et al., supra, at § 3.19.  Of these protections, most 
notable is that of the employees (union) to negotiate their contracts (terms and con-
ditions) in good faith with their employer by a certified representative. N.Y. CIV. 
SERV. LAW § 209-a(1)(d).  The employees therefore are protected from the employer 
bypassing the negotiation and bargaining process before implementing a policy “per-
taining to a mandatory subject of bargaining.” LEFKOWITZ et al., supra, at § 3.19.  The 
terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of negotiation. N.Y. 
CIV. SERV. LAW § 204(2).  This subject includes “salaries, wages, hours and other 
terms and conditions of employment.” N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 201(4).  Further, 
health, dental and life insurance are mandatory subjects of bargaining. LEFKOWITZ et 
al., supra, at § 7.7.  The Taylor Law also preserves the contracts status quo when the 
previous contract has expired and is being negotiated. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-
a(1)(e).  With this protection all the contract provisions from the previous contract 
remain in effect until a new contract is created, unless the union affects the status quo 
such as an illegal strike. LEFKOWITZ et al., supra, at § 3.19; see also In re Village of 
Valley Stream, 6 PERB 3076 (1973).  It is for this reason that a municipality has 
trouble cutting the salaries or benefits from the public sector workforce—there can 
be no cuts unless negotiated because the expired contract is preserved until a new 
contract is negotiated. See Rick Karlin, Tax Cap Pressures Work Rules in Contracts, 
TIMES UNION, Nov. 1, 2011, at A3 (“Now that there is a 2 percent property tax cap in 
the state, towns, counties and school districts need to see changes in work rules that 
govern labor contracts between municipalities and public sector unions.”). 
 129. See Association of Towns, Tax Cap Information for Towns, http://www.ny 
towns.org/web/2011/08/tax_cap_information_for_towns.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 
2011). 
 130. Letter from Richard J. Graham, County Attorney, Lewis County, New York, 
to Eric T. Scheiderman, Attorney General, State of New York (Aug. 25, 2011) (on 
file with authors).  The Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York has 
declined to opine as to the constitutionality of the statute because it is “longstanding” 
policy for the Attorney General’s Office to decline giving an opinion as to the consti-
tutionality of a state statute. Letter from Kathryn Sheingold, Assistant Solicitor Gen-
eral in Charge of Opinions, to Rodger A. Wickes, President of the County Attorney’s 
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The request asked the Attorney General to consider whether the new 
legislation violates Article VIII §§ 8, 10-A, and 12 of the New York 
State Constitution, specifically Article VIII § 12, which states: 
Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent the legislature 
from further restricting the powers herein specified of any county, 
city, town, village or school district to contract indebtedness or to 
levy taxes on real estate. The legislature shall not, however, restrict 
the power to levy taxes on real estate for the payment of interest on 
or principal of indebtedness theretofore contracted.131  
Based on long-standing policy of the Office, the Attorney General 
declined to comment on the constitutionality of a state statute since 
the Office could be called upon to defend the statute.132 
Scholars and policymakers may debate the effectiveness of proper-
ty tax caps in general, as well as caps mandated in tough economic 
times.  For example, in Massachusetts, Proposition 2 ½ researchers 
asserted that a property tax cap enacted during an economic recession 
would impair local government, resulting in cuts to vital services and 
most notably decreases in school budgets.133  The researchers noted 
that the loss of property tax revenue will increase the need for state 
aid, which “can be a highly volatile revenue source.”134  Therefore, 
the study concluded that tax caps during a weak economy are harmful 
to local governments because state aid cannot be expected to fill the 
revenue loss.135 
 
Association of New York and County Attorney for Washington County, New York  
(Sept. 28, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 131. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 12 (emphasis added).  This concern was expressed by 
Lewis County, New York. In Lewis County, the letter explained, the County’s out-
standing indebtedness is $13.3 million and the tax levy limit for fiscal year 2012 would 
be $249,000 when the increase to the county’s budget, for Medicaid alone, is 
$230,000.  Letter from Richard J. Graham to Eric T. Scheiderman, supra note 130. 
 132. Letter from Kathryn Sheingold to Roger A. Wickes, supra note 130. 
 133. See Phil Oliff & Iris J. Lav, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, Hidden 
Consequences: Lessons From Massachusetts for States Considering a Property Tax 
Cap, at 7 (2010), available at  http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-21-08sfp.pdf.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  One article reports that an eleven-year-old, 1850 square foot home in 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, worth $305,000, was assessed $4579 in annual property tax-
es.  In contrast, a twenty-one-year-old, 1850 square foot home in Troy, New York, 
worth $164,000, was assessed $6564 in property taxes, demonstrating a stark differ-
ence between property tax liabilities in New York and in Massachusetts. See Rick 
Karlin, Lesson in Tax Relief, TIMES UNION, Oct. 29, 2011, at A1. 
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3. New York’s Unfunded Mandate Problem 
Further exacerbating the fiscal stress on local governments is a long 
list of unfunded state mandates.  New York Counties are feeling this 
stress because they have no control over the cost of mandated pro-
grams including Medicaid, pre-school special education, welfare, pen-
sion rate increases, early intervention, child protective services, youth 
detention facilities, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), TANF Safety Net, food stamp administration, public health 
care services, indigent legal defense services, and probation.136  In Sul-
livan County, the cost of unfunded state mandates relating to health 
and family services is 50% of the overall budget.137 
A 1973 report of the Temporary State Commission on the Powers 
of Local Government documents the tensions over state mandates on 
local governments, stating: 
In many localities, officials feel that their units of government are 
treated as poor relatives in the distribution of resources by the high-
er levels of government, even though local residents and their busi-
ness enterprises are the principal tax source for these higher gov-
ernment levels . . . . [T]hey see themselves being harassed and op-
oppressed by supervening agencies invested with the power to affect 
the lives of entire neighborhoods and communities, without being 
required to secure the approval or even consult with local authori-
ties. Finally, local governments feel themselves weighed down by 
costly and at times oppressive State legislative mandates for new 
functions, programs and employee benefits.138 
States have always mandated that local governments take specific 
actions.139  The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
 
 136. Mark LaVigne, Property Tax Relief Must Begin with Mandate Reform (Sept. 
24, 2010), http://nysac.org/news/nysac-news/property-tax-relief-must-begin-with-
mandate-reform (asserting that most of these mandated programs place over 50% of 
the implementation cost on the counties). 
 137. Ira J. Cohen, Unfunded Mandates Continue to Force Property Tax Hikes 
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://nysac.org/news/nysac-news/unfunded-mandates-continue-to-
force-property-tax-hikes/ (explaining that 75% of the budget is dedicated to all un-
funded mandates both federal and state wide, allowing for 25% of the budget to be 
discretionary). 
 138. Unfunded Mandates, supra note 76, § I (quoting TEMPORARY STATE COMMIS-
SION ON THE POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1973)). 
 139. Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental Relations, Mandates: Cases in State 
and Local Relations 1 (1990), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Rep 
orts/information/M-173.pdf. 
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lations (ACIR) first studied the state mandate issue in 1978.140  In ad-
dition to the fiscal tensions, the 1978 report noted another concern 
with state mandates, “ . . . substitut[ing] state for local priorities.”141  
Local governments see mandates as restraining their ability to act in 
the best interests of their own citizens and the demands of their popu-
lations.142  In 1990, the ACIR found that the New York legislature re-
viewed 20,000 bills a year and 85% of them placed a financial demand 
on either the state or the local governments.143 
Typically, local governments accept state mandates more readily 
when they seek to achieve a uniform statewide policy as opposed to 
when they individually apply to certain localities.144  In its 1990 report, 
the ACIR addressed the different sources and comparative legitimacy 
of state mandates.145  There are various legal authorities within state 
government from which mandates may emanate: the state constitu-
tion, citizen initiatives, statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative 
rulemaking.146  Commenting on the legitimacy of these sources, the 
ACIR stated that, “[i]t can be argued that those sources closer to the 
people have more democratic legitimacy, while those farther removed 
from the citizenry have less democratic legitimacy because their polit-
ical accountability is less direct.”147 
To satisfy increasing fiscal demands necessitated through unfunded 
mandates, local governments often are forced to raise property taxes, 
the only viable source of revenue to pay for the unwanted expense.148  
Therefore, the problem is amplified when the state that restrains the 
local taxing power simultaneously requires local governments to 
comply with certain mandates,149 hence the cry emanating from mu-
nicipal officials in response to the property tax cap described in the 
previous section. A recent editorial summed it up well:  
With New York’s current fiscal crisis, local governments in New 
York State can’t expect more state aid anytime soon, and they’ll be 
 
 140. Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental Relations, State Mandating of Local 
Expenditures 1 (1978), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/poli 
cy/A-67.pdf [hereinafter Local Expenditures]. 
 141. Id. at 2. 
 142. Local Expenditures, supra note 140, at 6. 
 143. Id. at 51. 
 144. Id. at 3. 
 145. Id. at 1. 
 146. Id. at 3. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 13. 
 149. Id. at 4–5. 
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very lucky to keep what they have now.  If the state can’t provide 
money, it can at least provide something that can save money: man-
date relief.150 
4. The Modern State Response to the Unfunded Mandate 
Challenge 
Over the years, various state legislatures and governors have at-
tempted to study the mandate problem.  For example, in 1977 Gover-
nor Hugh Carey acknowledged the heavy burden state mandates 
place on local governments and affirmed his commitment to reduce 
the unnecessary administrative and financial costs that they impose.151  
The next year, the ACIR noted: “[i]t would be difficult to find an is-
sue that sparks more resentment among local officials than that 
caused by state-mandated expenditures.”152  A central finding of 
ACIR’s report was that New York State imposed mandates on its lo-
cal governments in sixty of the seventy-seven functional areas stud-
ied––the most of any state.153 
In 1981, the New York Legislative Commission on Expenditure 
Review (LCER) compiled a comprehensive list of mandates in New 
York.154  The LCER report focused just on the mandates imposed on 
county governments, and found a total of 2632 mandates, of which 
608 (23%) were the most onerous ones that imposed additional costs 
without providing funding for them.155 
More than thirty years later, Governor David Paterson called for 
mandate relief in his January 2009 address to the Legislature.156  In 
April 2009, Governor Paterson issued an Executive Order prohibiting 
Executive branch agencies from recommending, proposing, publish-
ing, or submitting legislation or regulations containing a mandate 
 
 150. Editorial, Time for State to Get Serious about Mandate Relief, DAILY GA-
ZETTE (Schenectady, NY) (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.dailygazette.com/news/2008/dec 
/01/1201_edit1/?print. 
 151. Governor Hugh L. Carey, Budget Message: Relaxation on State-Imposed Lo-
cal Government Mandates, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF HUGH L. CAREY (1977), 1807, 1814. 
 152. Local Expenditures, supra note 140, at 1. 
 153. Id. at 3. 
 154. See generally State of N.Y. Legislative Commission on Expenditure Review, 
State Mandates to Counties (1981). 
 155. Id. at 12. 
 156. Governor David A. Paterson, State of the State Address: Our Time to Lead 
(Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/keydocs/pdf/speech_0107091. 
pdf.  The Governor stated that “State mandates are too burdensome.  We should re-
lieve them.” Id. 
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without first analyzing their impact on local governments.157  The Or-
der also put the Legislature on notice that he would not sign any bill 
that did not comply with this Order.158 
Governor Andrew Cuomo continued Paterson’s effort in January 
2011 when he issued Executive Order No. 6 which established the 
Mandate Relief Team to study the effects of unfunded mandates on 
property taxes.159  A preliminary report issued in 2011 presents rec-
ommendations for initial relief for municipalities and school dis-
tricts.160  The report suggests that New York State should stop the 
“proliferation of mandates” by prohibiting them in a constitutional 
amendment and in the interim through statute.161  The report also 
recommends that a cost analysis be completed with every bill, requir-
ing bill sponsors for proposed legislation that would “substantially” 
affect local government finances, to prepare a “fiscal impact note” 
along with the bill.162  The ACIR has already suggested fiscal notes, 
but while fiscal notes are a way to prevent potential unfunded future 
mandates, they are not effective for addressing existing mandates.163 
Other recommendations include creating a new pension tier designed 
to reduce existing local pension contribution liabilities164 and amend-
ing the State Administrative Procedures Act (SAPA) to provide 
more flexibility in managing unfunded mandates.165  The report 
charges the Mandate Relief Team with supplementing its report with 
 
 157. N.Y. State Exec. Order No. 17 (2009). 
 158. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7.17 (2009). 
 159. N.Y. State Exec. Order No. 6 (2011). 
 160. Unfunded Mandates, supra note 76, § I. 
 161. Id. § II A. 
 162. Id.  Requiring this analysis would enable local governments to review the fis-
cal implications of each bill, increasing government transparency and accountability. 
 163. Local Expenditures, supra note 140, at 50. 
 164. The report noted that “pension spending is one of the major cost drivers in the 
state. . . .  [It] can have a significant impact on the local property tax burden.” Un-
funded Mandates, supra note 76, § II B.  Further, in 2010, all municipalities outside of 
New York City paid approximately $2 billion in pension costs, 7% of taxes levied in 
those areas. See id.  Therefore, the report recommends creating a new pension tier 
where employees contribute more, the minimum retirement age is raised, and the 
length required to work prior to pension is extended. See id. 
 165. Specifically, the report acknowledges that the SAPA process discourages local 
governments from seeking relief because of a complicated petition process, and states 
that an amendment to SAPA § 204 may allow the local government to search for al-
ternatives to implement the mandate as well as waivers for avoiding the mandate. See 
id. § II C.  Further, the report recommends that all agencies involved in creating 
mandates should be required to complete a “full agency review” of the mandates’ 
impacts on local governments. See id. 
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quarterly updates and a final report by the end of the 2011–2012 fiscal 
year.166 
Furthermore, as part of the 2011 Property Tax Cap law, a number 
of initiatives were enacted for the purpose of reducing some fiscal 
burdens on local governments.  For example, language was added to 
the State Administrative Procedures Act to allow a local government 
or local governments jointly to seek approval for an “alternate meth-
od of implementing a regulatory mandate by submitting [a petition] 
to the appropriate state agency.”167  The agency then has thirty days 
to make a decision regarding the petition.168  In addition, the new law 
creates a Mandate Relief Council, consisting of eleven members in-
cluding the Secretary to the Governor (Chair), Counsel to the Gov-
ernor, the Director of the Division of Budget, the Secretary of State, 
three members appointed form the governor’s executive chamber 
staff, two members appointed by temporary president of the senate, 
and two appointed by the speaker of the assembly.169  The Mandate 
Relief council is designed to identify and review mandates that can be 
eliminated or reformed.170  The Mandate Relief Council, however, 
may not consider federal mandates or federal eligibility standards, 
mandates that apportion the costs of activities between boards of ed-
ucation and municipalities, mandates emanating from the state consti-
tution, or mandates that are necessary for the public health and safety 
of the people of New York.171  For regulatory mandates that the 
council has found to be “imposed upon any local government in an 
unsound, unduly burdensome or costly manner,” the council may re-
 
 166. N.Y. State Exec. Order No. 6 (2011). 
 167. New York State Administrative Procedure Act, N.Y.P.A. § 204-a(2) (2011); 
see 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856 (McKinney 2011). 
 168. N.Y. STATE A.P.A. LAW § 204-a(2) (McKinney 2011); see 2011 N.Y. Sess. 
Laws 5856. 
 169. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856. 
 170. Id. (“The council shall, upon request of a local government or one of the 
members of the council, identify and review mandates that can be eliminated or re-
formed, and make such other and further inquiries, reports and recommendations as 
the council may deem necessary and prudent to effectuate its mission of mandate re-
lief. In identifying and determining whether such mandates are unsound, unduly bur-
densome or costly, the council shall receive and consider public comment about them 
and shall review them in light of cost-benefit principles and such other and further 
factors as the council shall deem necessary and prudent.”). 
 171. Id. (“(i) those which are required to comply with federal laws or rules or to 
meet eligibility standards for federal entitlements; (ii) those which reapportion the 
costs of activities between boards of education, counties, and municipalities; (iii) 
those which implement provisions of the state constitution; and (iv) those which the 
council determines are necessary for the maintenance of the public health or safety of 
the people of New York State.”). 
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fer a request by a local government to the appropriate agency pursu-
ant to the N.Y. Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA) for a waiver, 
modification, or repeal of the regulatory mandate.172  If the Council 
votes to make the referral the agency shall provide all necessary sup-
port to allow the local government to submit their petition in accord-
ance with the SAPA provisions.173 If the relief sought is not provided 
by the state agency the Council may hear an appeal and grant appro-
priate relief.174 Aside from a referral the Council may also, with a two-
thirds vote, refer the mandate to the governor for a repeal or modifi-
cation of the mandate because of its unsound, unduly burdensome, 
and costly effect on local governments.175  When a statutory mandate 
is involved, with a seven person vote the council can refer the desig-
nated unsound, unduly burdensome, and costly mandate to the gov-
ernor for repeal or modification.176  Further, a local government can 
pass a resolution to request that the council examine a statutory or 
regulatory mandate for possible repeal or modification.177  A local 
government, however, may only make three requests per calendar 
year.178  In addition, a majority vote can designate the mandates as 
unsound, unduly burdensome, and costly and therefore necessary to 
reform or repeal; however, the majority vote is not a judicial determi-
nation under the law.179  Although the efforts in this most recent legis-
lative enactment are a start, the municipal associations continue to 
call upon the Governor and the Legislature to eliminate more signifi-
cant unfunded mandates.180  As of the time this Article was written, 
the Governor’s Mandate Relief Council has yet to take any publically 
reported actions, so the jury is out as to whether this initiative will 
yield successful returns for struggling local governments. 
 
 172. Id.; N.Y. State A.P.A. Law § 204-a. 
 173. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856; N.Y. State A.P.A. Law § 204-a. 
 174. 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 5856. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Karlin, supra note 128 (reporting that the New York Conference of Mayors 
noted that the cost of personnel is a large part of a municipality’s budget and new 
rules governing public sector work contracts are necessary to provide relief to munic-
ipalities which are trying to comply with the property tax cap). 
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II.  DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 
AND VEHICLES FOR CIVIL DISCOURSE AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR 
MUNICIPAL FISCAL DECISION MAKING 
The preceding Part explained the challenges facing local govern-
ment officials with respect to making difficult fiscal budgeting deci-
sions, especially in the context of the current economy and the pre-
sent environment of unfunded mandates, fixed government costs, 
dwindling revenues and now a property tax cap.  As documented 
above, municipal officials have been trying since the late 1970s to un-
do many unfunded mandates, meeting with only minor periodic relief.  
Required expenditures, including payments pursuant to public sector 
collective bargaining agreements and public pension fund contribu-
tions, account for a significant percentage of municipal budgets.181  
Many required local expenditures can be traced to federal and state 
statutes and directives, and therefore do not fall within the exclusive 
purview of each individual municipality to control.182  Further, absent 
a constitutional amendment to allow for initiatives and referenda in 
New York, local residents have little power to force state legislators 
to provide relief from these fiscal requirements.  While municipal of-
ficials and advocates continue the important work of educating feder-
al and state lawmakers about the costly impacts of these mandates 
and requirements on local governments, the current fiscal crisis pre-
sents the perfect storm to positively engage members of the public in 
taking greater ownership and interest in fiscal issues, and in providing 
meaningful input into the local budgeting process.  A number of par-
ticipatory frameworks exist from deliberative democracy processes to 
civic engagement strategies.  This Part of the Article addresses differ-
ent models that offer potential opportunities for the public to provide 
meaningful input and articulate preferences and priorities when it 
comes to the allocation of limited dollars to support local government 
service delivery. 
The most identifiable method of public engagement is the public 
hearing.183  Typically, however, state enabling statutes simply require 
 
 181. See Local Government and School Accountability, Cost Saving Ideas: Over-
time Management and Planning, N.Y. OFFICE STATE COMPTROLLER, http://www.osc. 
state.ny.us/localgov/costsavings/overtimeplanning.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
 182. See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of 
a Problem, 27 YALE J. REG. 351, 377 (2010). 
 183. Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in 
Siting Wind Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 355 (2011). 
SALKIN & GOTTLIEB_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:24 AM 
756 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
one public hearing prior to local legislative decision making.184  For 
example, as part of the town budgeting process in New York, the 
budget is drafted by the budget officer who then turns the tentative 
budget into the town clerk, after which the town board reviews the 
budget and modifies it as needed.185  The town board then conducts a 
public hearing where town residents may voice their concerns.186  Af-
ter the public hearing occurs, the town board may change the prelim-
inary budget further, but state law does not require another public 
hearing.187  The local government, however, may prescribe additional 
requirements.188  The required public hearing is not an effective 
method of public engagement for a number of reasons.  First, hear-
ings typically do not promote dialogue between members of the pub-
lic and decision makers because to satisfy the law, legislators need on-
ly provide an opportunity for the public to speak.  The legislators 
need not respond.  Next, members of the public speak to the decision 
making body, but they do not have the opportunity to engage each 
other in conversation.  Furthermore, members of the public typically 
have only a limited amount of time and to provide comments, and in-
dividuals are often prevented from speaking more than once during 
the hearing.  These limitations mean that members of the public can-
not respond to other comments.  Public hearings can leave members 
of a community dissatisfied and frustrated, feeling disconnected and 
lacking ownership in the ultimate decision. 
A. Deliberative Democracy 
In the participatory governance model, however, active involve-
ment of residents in government decision making which may include 
deliberative democracy and collaborative governance is preferable.189  
It is when the vote is taken from the politicians and placed into the 
 
 184. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265(a) (McKinney 2010) (requiring a public hear-
ing prior to an amendment to the zoning provisions);  N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-708 
(McKinney 2010) (requiring a public hearing prior to an amendment to the zoning 
provisions); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712 (McKinney 2010) (requiring the Zoning 
Board of Appeals to hold public meetings);  N.Y. GEN CITY LAW § 81-a (McKinney 
2010) (requiring the Zoning Board of Appeals to hold public meetings). 
 185. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 106 (1)–(4). 
 186. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 108; see also N.Y. COUNTY LAW §§ 359–60; N.Y. VILLAGE 
LAW § 5-508(3)–(4). 
 187. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 109 (1)–(2). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Nolon, supra note 183, at 355.  Recently, “[e]fforts to involve citizens directly 
in governmental decision making have showed great promise and produced modest 
successes.” Id. 
SALKIN & GOTTLIEB_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  8:24 AM 
2012] DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 757 
“public sphere” that accountability and justification will emerge with-
in government decision making.190  For this to occur, the public must 
be united by a shared “collective identity.”191  That is to say, the pub-
lic should engage in collaborative techniques to shape their opinions 
collectively, working together to form a policy that reflects those col-
lective opinions. 
The theory of deliberative democracy suggests that the public can 
improve democracy by questioning and participating in governance, 
ensuring that government is run by the public’s standards.  Delibera-
tive democracy is founded on principles of accountability and discus-
sion between members of the public to facilitate a deliberation that 
will better inform the public’s opinions.192  This method embraces a 
“talk-centric” model of democracy instead of a “voting-centric” mod-
el.193  Further, scholars note that deliberative democracy is “a com-
municative process based on reason . . . [and] is able to transform in-
dividual preferences and reach decisions oriented to the public 
good.”194  As a result, the laws and policies will be based on the input 
of individual community members.195  People engaged in discussions 
will form opinions and decisions around the information learned and 
brought out through the discussions,196 and after the discussions, a 
goal of the process is that the group will be bound by the decision it 
has made.197  This deliberative process allows for more competent 
government decision making because it ensures that the decisions re-
flect the public’s well-reasoned opinions.198  In turn, this outcome 
connects the public with the governmental decision makers, doing 
away with the divide that is a cause for concern with most community 
members.199 
 
 190. Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
307, 309 (2003). 
 191. Id. at 314. 
 192. Id. at 308.  Voting-centric democracy uses “fixed preferences and interests” 
and implements them through a voting process, while talk-centric democracy focuses 
on the formulation of fixed preferences and interests prior to voting through proper 
communication. Id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Politi-
cal Science, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 497, 501 (2008). 
 195. Archon Fung, Democratic Theory and Political Science: A Pragmatic Method 
of Constructive Engagement, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 449 (2007). 
 196. Chambers, supra note 190, at 309. 
 197. Thompson, supra note 194, at 502. 
 198. See Fung, supra note 195, at 449. 
 199. Id. 
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Essential to participatory governance is the concept of delibera-
tion.200  Deliberation is not to be confused with a debate.  When par-
ties debate over public policy, they each attempt to discredit the other 
side’s arguments by identifying weaknesses.201  On the other hand, de-
liberation is a process that involves “participants listen[ing] in an ef-
fort to better understand the other’s viewpoint and identify questions 
or areas of confusion to probe for a deeper understanding.  Delibera-
tion is the thoughtful consideration of information, views, and ide-
as.”202  In essence, the deliberative model offers a process where dif-
fering viewpoints and interests can be expressed and participants can 
search for common ground. 
1. Methods of Deliberative Democracy 
Three methods of deliberative democracy have been identified: dis-
tributed deliberation, iterated deliberation, and decentralized delib-
eration.  The first, “distributed deliberation,” calls for different tasks 
during the deliberative process to be assigned to different groups.203  
“Distributed deliberation” recognizes that not all groups will be effec-
tive and attempts to maximize both effectiveness and efficiency by 
tasking different groups with different goals.204 
The second method, “iterated deliberation,” is where a decision 
making body solicits the help of a deliberating body that will deliber-
ate on a suggested proposal and then send the proposal back to the 
governing body for correction, after which the proposal once more is 
sent back to the deliberating body for another round.205  This process 
embraces the notion of self correction on behalf of the governing 
body and invites criticism from the deliberative body.206 
“Decentralized deliberation” is the third method of deliberative 
democracy that limits the deliberative process to a unified system 
where all interested groups can engage in the deliberative process.207  
Participatory budgeting is the most commonly cited example of a de-
 
 200. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and 
the Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 269, 278 (2009). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Thompson, supra note 194, at 514. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 515. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 514. 
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centralized deliberation process.208  Participatory budgeting allows the 
public to be involved with budgeting priorities, resulting in a “reflec-
tive preference” of the public which is then integrated into the local 
government’s budget.209  Such a participatory democracy framework 
holds that the citizens must have taken a direct part in the decision 
making process such as making and hearing arguments, creating poli-
cies and choosing between alternatives provided.210 
2. Civil Discourse 
Civil discourse is the overarching term within deliberative democ-
racy that describes the different levels and methods of participation 
that the public can utilize.211  The concept levels the playing field for 
all participants and seeks to eliminate the adversarial and hierarchical 
systems for a more efficient way to reach conflict resolutions.212  The 
goal is to achieve a respectful way in which community members can 
engage in discussions to improve the government decision making 
process and become more actively involved in informing policy deci-
sions.213  As such, public participants become a part of public policy 
decision making instead of standing idly by waiting for the policy ef-
fects.214  Within the broader theory of civil discourse, citizen advisory 
groups, citizen panels, citizen juries, citizen initiative, negotiated rule 
making, mediation, compensation, and benefit sharing are all forms of 
public participation.215 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Fung, supra note 195, at 450. 
 211. See Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler & Peter Wiedemann, A Need for Dis-
course on Citizen Participation: Objectives and Structure of the Book, in FAIRNESS 
AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL DISCOURSE 3 (Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler & Peter Wiedemann eds., 
1995). 
 212. See id. 
 213. See American Bar Association, Affirms Role of Lawyers to Promote Civil 
Public Discourse, Resolution (2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/ 
wp-content/files_flutter/1312826039108.pdf (“[T]he American Bar Association af-
firms the principle of civility as a foundation for democracy and the rule of law and 
urges lawyers to set a high standard for civil discourse as an example for others in re-
solving differences constructively and without disparagement of others . . . .  [T]he 
American Bar Association urges all lawyers, ABA member entities and other bar as-
sociations to take meaningful steps to enhance the constructive role of lawyers in 
promoting a more civil and deliberative public discourse.”). 
 214. See Renn et al., supra note 211, at 1. 
 215. Id. at 10. 
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For example, Project Civil Discourse, an initiative of the Arizona 
Humanities Council, engages community members in dialogue ses-
sions involving controversial public policy issues.216  A core principle 
guiding this effort is respecting the opinion of all the participants in 
order to have a successful collaboration.217  One of the recent Project 
Civil Discourse sessions focused on a local finance topic, “Arizona’s 
Sales Tax Referendum Town Hall: A Demonstration of Civil Dia-
logue and Discussion.”218  The May 2010 session attracted 100 people 
who gathered to better understand “the implications of the sales tax 
vote on Arizona’s budget, and more importantly to demonstrate how 
an issue such as taxes can be discussed in a civil and respectful 
way.”219  The large group was divided into smaller tables where 
trained facilitators engaged the participants in discussions of pre-
determined questions.220 
The outcome of the discussions varied and there were differences 
of opinion as to what services the state should provide to its resi-
dents.221  A majority of the participants believed that the referendum 
should pass considering the tough financial times that Arizona faced, 
and many expressed the opinion that tax cuts are not the answer dur-
ing a financial crisis, reasoning that tax cuts may have contributed to 
 
 216. PROJECT CIVIL DISCOURSE, http://www.projectcivildiscourse.org/index.php 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (stating that public policy issues at the center of a civil dis-
course program may involve “growth, education, healthcare, religion, race, immigra-
tion and transportation”).  Further, the dialogue sessions include “trainings, forums, 
and special events that share, model and provide insight on collaborative problem-
solving skills.” Id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Past Events: Sales Tax Referendum, PROJECT CIVIL DISCOURSE, http://www. 
projectcivildiscourse.org/arizona_sales_tax_referendum.php (last visited Oct. 31, 
2011). 
 219. Project Civil Discourse, Arizona’s Sales Tax Referendum Town Hall: A 
Demonstration of Civil Dialogue and Discussion 1 (2010), available at http://www.pro 
jectcivildiscourse.org/media/PCD%20Sales%20Tax%20Town%20Hall%20Report.p
df. 
 220. Id. at 2.  The questions presented were:  
1. There are viewpoints in favor of and against the proposed sales tax in-
crease, which would raise the State of Arizona sales tax by 1% for three 
years. What are your thoughts about the different perspectives, giving par-
ticular consideration to the types of services that the state government 
should provide its citizens?  
2. Regardless of the outcome of the May 18th referendum, the task of plan-
ning for Arizona’s long-term financial needs remains. What actions might 
Arizona citizens, elected officials, business leaders, and others take to meet 
the state’s future financial needs? 
Id. 
 221. Id. 
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the financial crisis.222  Other issues discussed included redesigning the 
tax revenue system in Arizona and alternate methods of increasing 
revenue and control costs.223  The final report includes the ideas that 
emerged from the discussion as well as feedback from the partici-
pants.224  It was noted in the report that the goal was not to change 
any minds but instead to understand the different viewpoints regard-
ing governmental policy.225 
B. Participatory Budgeting 
Another form of deliberative democracy or participatory govern-
ance is participatory budgeting, which allows for “an opportunity for 
citizens to engage in the processes of public spending decision making 
focused on their neighborhood, locality, or a particular public agen-
cy.”226  This strategy gives community members a voice to influence 
their local budget by prioritizing local government spending and the 
allocation of public resources.227  Participants have the opportunity to 
have their preferences impact local government decisions since the 
goal is for the local government to take the public preferences and 
translate them “into concrete budget items through a sophisticated 
system of grading and weighing preferences.”228  Success is dependent 
on how the locality decides to organize its participatory budgeting 
scheme, tailoring the system to its unique characteristics, population, 
and geography.229 
Participatory budgeting was first used in 1989 in Porto Alegre, Bra-
zil, and it has been gaining popularity in other Latin American cit-
ies.230  Prior to 1989, Porto Alegre was in dire financial straits and the 
 
 222. Id. at 6.  Conversely, some supported tax cuts that would have the effect of 
stimulating the economy. Id. 
 223. Id. at 8–9. 
 224. See generally id. 
 225. Id. at 9. 
 226. Communities and Local Government, Empowering Communities to Influence 
Local Decision Making: A Systematic Review of the Evidence 98 (2009), available at 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/1241955. 
 227. Romulo Silveria da Rocha Sampaio, Regulating Climate Change Risk at the 
Local Level—The Denver Experience: Green-print or Greenwash?, 17 MO. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 356, 387 (2010). 
 228. Colin Crawford, Our Bandit Future? Cities, Shantytowns, and Climate 
Change Governance, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 248 (2009); see also Sampaio, supra 
note 227, at 387. 
 229. See Crawford, supra note 228, at 246. 
 230. See id. at 244; see also Dorit Rebinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Mod-
ernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 
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participatory budgeting system was initially set in place to show the 
community the hardships of the budgeting process.231  By the mid-
1990s, the region was financially sound, due in part to a series of pro-
gressive taxes that the municipality levied allowing for more funding 
for governmental projects selected by the participatory budgeting 
process.232  On another level, the participatory budgeting process has 
been successful in creating public rights.  Members of the public now 
have a right to participate in governmental decision making, and 
community members enjoy the right to have the ideas they articulate 
during the budgeting process become binding upon the municipality 
to enact into law.233  A typical design separates a municipality into its 
various regions where public meetings take place over a period of 
time.234  At these meetings, budget and policy proposals are discussed 
and negotiated while delegates are elected to represent each region.235  
Further, a municipal participatory budget council is elected, consist-
ing of two representatives from each region, to oversee and make fi-
nal decisions.236  Once the participatory budget is approved, it goes 
before the local legislative body for final approval.237 
An important advantage of the participatory budgeting process is 
that it creates transparency in governmental decision making.  Fur-
ther, the often excluded low-income and less educated members of a 
locality are empowered to participate in policy making and influence 
the local budget by helping to prioritize the spending and allocation 
of resources.238  Arguably, participatory budgeting creates a more ef-
 
338–39 (2008–2009).  In Porto Alegre, the locality organized its public participants 
into assemblies consisting of sixteen regional districts to deliberate on the budget. Id.  
Participants in each assembly discussed all resources concerning the budget, including 
sewage, transportation, health care, and housing. Id.; see Ngai Pindell, Finding a 
Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the United 
States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 458 (2006); Thompson, supra note 194, at 514; 
see also REBECCA ABERS, INVENTING LOCAL DEMOCRACY: GRASSROOTS POLITICS IN 
BRAZIL 2 (2000). 
 231. BRIAN WAMPLER, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN BRAZIL: CONTESTATION, 
COOPERATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 126 (2007). 
 232. Id. at 126–27. 
 233. Id. at 127–28. 
 234. Id. at 52. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 53. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 68.  Participatory budgeting is about access to government officials to 
lobby them for resources.  Therefore, participatory budgeting allows those less fortu-
nate, who otherwise would not have this access to government officials, the oppor-
tunity to lobby for a different allocation of resources. Id. at 66. 
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ficient budgetary process, resulting in better public policy decisions 
made through the deliberative process.  Perhaps the best outcome of 
a process such as this is that the public becomes better informed and 
educated about the local government’s fiscal picture, and the public is 
forced to prioritize a litany of services from the standpoint of com-
munity values and needs. 
Participatory budgeting and governance, however, is not perfect.  
One challenge is that “the deliberation focuses on ‘very local goods 
and needs’ and does not dispose ‘citizens to think about the greater 
good of the city, the just trade-offs between jurisdictions or the good 
of the city through the long arc of time.’”239  Furthermore, the success 
of participatory democracy depends on the government’s ability to 
make institutional changes to give the public a chance to be involved 
in government decision making.240  A problem in the deliberative 
process can occur when the public participants are not educated on 
the topic discussed.241  The concept of “meta-deliberation” can bridge 
this gap between the deliberative body and the expert assistance that 
must be a part of the resolution.  Citizen assemblies are an example of 
such a method utilized to bridge this gap.242  For example, British Co-
lumbia, Canada has experimented with the notion of using Citizen 
Assemblies, suggesting that, “ordinary citizens can acquire the com-
petence necessary to design political institutions,” which is a highly 
complex matter.243  In Canada, citizen assemblies created by random-
ly selecting (accounting for regional and gender percentages) 160 
constituents engaged in a deliberative process to discuss a political 
change in the voting system from a majoritarian system to a more 
proportional system.244  The group met every other weekend for a 
year where it “learned about various electoral designs, attended open 
meetings to solicit public opinions, and deliberated about the merits 
of various voting systems.”245  An electoral change is a highly complex 
issue because “[t]he deliberation in the assembly is quite different 
from the deliberation in the public, who in the [Canadian] case ulti-
mately vote in a referendum on the assembly’s recommendation.”246  
Further, the use of the assembly differs from a legislative action be-
 
 239. Thompson, supra note 194, at 514. 
 240. Fung, supra note 195, at 450. 
 241. Thompson, supra note 194, at 515. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Fung, supra note 195, at 452. 
 244. Id. at 450; Thompson, supra note 194, at 515. 
 245. Fung, supra note 195, at 450. 
 246. Thompson, supra note 194, at 516. 
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cause the public makes the final decision in the form of a referen-
dum.247  Therefore, the assembly was able to pass the final vote to the 
citizens, and they reached their recommendations “for reasons that 
most ordinary voters are not likely to fully appreciate.”248 
1. Toronto, Canada 
A recent illustration of participatory budgeting is Toronto, Canada.  
The City Council, facing a budget gap of $774 million in 2012, under-
took a Core Service Review Program in 2011 in an attempt to review 
all city services and implement a multi-year financial planning mod-
el.249  The Core Service Review Program included a report from the 
city manager, a financial evaluation by KPMG, and a public engage-
ment strategy.250  KPMG’s review of Toronto’s services consisted of 
an analysis of services offered by the city, the city’s agencies, boards, 
and commissions, research, and a comparative analysis of surrounding 
municipalities.251  The KPMG assessment of Toronto’s services in-
cluded a determination of whether a service is core or discretionary 
and the “degree to which the standard was prescribed by legislation, 
set by Council, City management or by funding agreement.”252  The 
report indentified a list of opportunities and areas for potential cost 
savings.253  Among those potential cuts were selling assets such as the 
Toronto Zoo and the Sony Centre for the Performing Arts; selling or 
leasing parking lots; eliminating programs that issue grants to cultural 
institutions like the Toronto Symphony Orchestra and AIDS and 
drug prevention programs; and eliminating public dental health care 
programs.254  The KPMG consultants noted that Toronto has the 
highest police to population ratio in Ontario, and recommended that 
the city could reduce costs by reducing patrols to one officer and insti-
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 515. 
 249. City of Toronto Canada, Core Service Review Program Backgrounder 1 
(2011), available at http://www.toronto.ca/torontoservicereview/pdf/core_services_re 
view_backgrounder_july2011.pdf [hereinafter Review Program Backgrounder]. 
 250. See id. 
 251. Id. at 1–2. 
 252. Id. 
 253. City of Toronto, Core Service Review, Staff Report 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2011/pw/bgrd/backgroundfile-39504.pdf [herein-
after Staff Report]. 
 254. Natalie Alcoba, The KPMG Report: Close Libraries, Sell the Zoo, Cut Back 
on Police, NAT’L POST (July 21, 2011), http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/07/21/the-
kpmg-report-close-libraries-sell-the-zoo-cut-back-on-police/. 
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tuting a hiring freeze.255  The firm further recommended outsourcing 
parking enforcement, by-law enforcement, and towing and cutting the 
school crossing guard program.256  The KPMG consultants further 
identified the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) as an area of sub-
stantial savings.257  The report also identified $3.8 million for student 
nutrition programs, $840,000 for drug prevention programs, and $1.6 
million for AIDS prevention and education programs as potential ar-
eas for spending reductions, but acknowledged the probability of an 
adverse impact on the vulnerable populations.258 
The public engagement strategy was “designed to inform, involve 
and consult the public on city services.”259  For approximately five 
weeks, the public was encouraged to discuss city services and priori-
ties and to provide feedback through small group discussion, public 
meetings, interactive blogs, and feedback forms.260  The object of the 
public consultation was “[providing] information to the public so that 
they could participate in the process, providing multiple options for 
participation and input, providing input to the City, Standing Com-
mittees and Council to assist them in their deliberations, and closing 
the communication loop with participants by posting raw and ana-
lyzed data.”261  The input that the public provided was then compiled 
into a Public Consultation Report which contained the service areas 
where there was the greatest public feedback and an analysis of what 
the 13,000-plus participants felt were the most important issues facing 
the city.262  Issues identified included public transit, infrastructure, 
support and housing for low-income and homeless residents, afforda-
ble housing, police services, and various environmental programs.263  
Overall, the results of the public consultation affirmed that the public 
values and relies on the services that the city of Toronto delivers and 
that generally, their prioritization of public services correlated to the 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.  KPMG suggested the TTC’s budget of $1.5 billion might be reduced by 
contracting out some bus services but noted that the savings would not be realized for 
a few years. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Review Program Backgrounder, supra note 249, at 2. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Staff Report, supra note 253, at 4. 
 262. Review Program Backgrounder, supra note 249, at 3. 
 263. City of Toronto, Toronto Core Service Review, Public Consultation Report 
19–34 (2011), available at http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2011/pw/bgrd/backgro 
undfile-39507.pdf [hereinafter Public Consultation Report]. 
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rankings prepared by KPMG.264  Furthermore, the report revealed 
that the public had mixed views on how to pay for city services—
whether by increasing taxes or user fees, by service reductions rather 
than an increase in taxes or fees, or through a combination of tax and 
fee increases and service reductions.265  The public also recommended 
services that they believed could be provided by private sector or not-
for-profit actors.266 
The Public Consultation report revealed that the public found hav-
ing a transparent and accountable government to be their highest pol-
icy priority.267  Participants’ first choice for funding municipal pro-
grams was to increase property taxes to maintain the same level of 
city services currently being offered to residents, with increasing both 
user fees and property taxes to maintain the same level of services 
ranking a close second.268  The great majority of participants in the 
project supported an increase in property taxes, with a mean increase 
of slightly over 5%.269 
The KPMG experiment in Toronto is an example of participatory 
budgeting inasmuch as the city sought and compiled the public’s opin-
ion on what services it felt to be essential and others that it did not 
value as much.  The public’s opinion was also sought on the methods 
in which the government would use to raise the funds to continue 
such services.  Members of Toronto’s government did engage in de-
liberation with members of the public, by attending public hearings in 
which residents were given a forum to voice their opinions.270  These 
hearings and feedback forms revealed that overwhelmingly, the peo-
ple of Toronto had very similar and strong views on the direction the 
city could take to improve its budget crisis. 
C. Models of Collaboration: Lessons from Land Use and 
Environmental Law 
There are other vehicles for a deliberative democracy that fall un-
der the framework of participatory governance that can impact poli-
cy.  Also referred to as participatory planning, “[t]hese processes have 
been used to provide valuable information about how to manage fi-
 
 264. Staff Report, supra note 253, at 5. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Public Consultation Report, supra note 263, at 4.  
 268. Id. at 7. 
 269. Id. at 8. 
 270. See Bingham, supra note 200, at 278. 
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nancial resources, set energy priorities, manage natural resources, and 
enable disadvantaged populations to assess their current circumstanc-
es.”271  Looking for models from the land use and environmental 
fields can prove instructive since both government decision making 
regimes require elements of public participation and engagement dur-
ing various points in the process. Furthermore, one of the core princi-
ples of environmental justice is to engage meaningful public participa-
tion in the government decision making process.272  As a result, there 
is a wealth of experience to be studied and evaluated in terms of en-
gaging the public. 
Collaborative decision making processes have been successful in 
the land use arena where conflict often occurs between the locality, 
residents, and developers.  These entities can achieve success and ef-
ficiency when they use the collaborative concept in addition to the 
required, already in place, land use decision making framework at the 
local level.273  This outcome presents promise for the collaborative 
model when it comes to making local budgeting decisions. 
In the land use context, parties to a conflict often believe that they 
must follow the required scheme set in place by law for resolving con-
flicts.274  That required legal scheme, however, should not preclude 
other methods of conflict resolution.275  Professor Sean Nolon has 
pointed out success stories where “parties decided that using predom-
inately collaborative techniques presented significant advantages over 
predominantly adversarial techniques, and use of those techniques re-
sulted in an approval that enjoyed widespread support.”276 
First, lawyers must learn to appreciate the collaborative process be-
fore they will be willing to apply the schemes.  Lawyers seek predict-
 
 271. Nolon, supra note 183, at 357–58. 
 272. Environmental Justice, Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/basics/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2012). 
 273. See Sean F. Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate: Encouraging Collabora-
tive Approaches to Controversial Development Decision, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
103, 113–15 (2009). 
 274. See id. at 113. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. at 115.  Nolon describes one case where a developer was seeking to 
turn a nursing home into apartments for the elderly when he learned he could also 
subdivide the property.  He left the decision up to the residents on the condition that 
they would support the project. While the developer made his preference for senior 
housing known, the residents decided that subdividing the property would be the best 
fit, even after considering that the local board preferred a senior housing develop-
ment. Id. 
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able resolutions to conflicts and many see the collaborative mecha-
nisms as unpredictable.277  This idea of unpredictability stems from 
the absence of a required system to implement the collaborative pro-
cess, resulting in lawyers not knowing what to expect for their cli-
ents.278  This issue is an important one that can be addressed upfront 
by participants to facilitate shared process and outcome expectations. 
1. Community Advisory Groups 
Community advisory groups, advisory committees, or advisory 
boards are other mechanisms of collaborative decision making and 
are identified as a “more structured type of collaborative decision-
making process.”279  Professor Sheila Foster explains that public par-
ticipation through methods of public notice and comment periods in 
environmental law are ineffective because there is no requirement 
that the decision making deliberate in any meaningful way over the 
public comments.280  The public notice and comment processes have 
become more of a “decide, announce, and defend,” method of public 
participation rather than fully engaging and deliberating over public 
opinion.281  Because there is no true dialogue involved in public hear-
ings, they “are a poor forum for ‘extensive development of infor-
mation, a shared baseline of understanding, and the development of a 
consensus,’ which are necessary for a truly deliberative decision mak-
ing process.”282  It is in the area of environmental justice where the 
concern for not including minority opinions is most prevalent.283 
As an alternative, advisory groups can be established through stat-
ute or agency rules mandating the collaboration of private and public 
interests.284  Constituents or stakeholders are usually selected by the 
decision-making body or the entity who is most involved.285  Further, 
that body will select members to participate who have the perceived 
 
 277. Id. at 144. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 477 (2002). 
 280. See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO 
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 242–43 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster 
eds., 2nd ed. 2008). 
 281. John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory 
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 907–08 (1998). 
 282. THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO AD-
DRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 280, at 244. 
 283. Id. at 225. 
 284. Foster, supra note 279, at 477. 
 285. Applegate, supra note 281, at 921. 
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greatest interest in the outcome.286  These groups consist of repre-
sentatives from government agencies (federal, state, and local) advo-
cates, local business, and property owners (if applicable).287  If the 
conflict is highly technical, the group must have access to technical 
help that enables a layperson to become versed in the relevant tech-
nicalities and allows all interests to be influential.288 
Advisory committees should engage in “active deliberation,” with 
the goal of finding a consensus based resolution.289  Even if a consen-
sus cannot be reached by the constituents, “a successful citizens advi-
sory board can narrow areas of disagreement, help affected parties 
recognize others’ concerns and their bona fides, bring forward alter-
natives that had not previously been considered, and (if nothing else) 
elucidate the issues that remain to be resolved.”290 
As with all participatory models, information is an essential com-
ponent because without correct information, the participants will not 
be able to overcome their previous assumptions about the issue, ena-
bling them to provide an informed and unbiased recommendation.291  
Similarly, as with other models of public engagement, because adviso-
ry committees are a mere portion of the overall public decision-
making scheme, and the public as a whole cannot be involved, a high 
level of transparency is required to guard against public distrust in the 
process.292 
The benefits of the advisory group model to engage the public in 
governmental decision making include that it informs public agencies 
about the community’s preferences.  Members of the public have the 
opportunity to educate community members, and it allows for greater 
acceptance of governmental decisions.293  Further, the model’s struc-
ture may be more efficient, or at least manageable, because the deci-
sion-making body deals with a set number of community members, 
instead of the community as a whole.294  These benefits however, will 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Foster, supra note 279, at 479. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 478. 
 290. Applegate, supra note 281, at 921. 
 291. Id. at 941–42. 
 292. Id. at 945. 
 293. Frances M. Lynn & Jack D. Kartez, The Redemption of Citizen Advisory 
Committees: A Perspective from Critical Theory, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, 
supra note 211, at 89. 
 294. Id. 
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not be realized without key considerations in committee composition.  
Diversity of the committee is a key component, and most often, advi-
sory committees are not elected but are appointed by officials who 
usually have set agendas.295  Without a serious commitment to diversi-
ty and representation of all stakeholder interests, true public input 
may not be achieved.  Further, because advisory groups have no deci-
sion-making authority, the deliberative process can be perceived as 
ineffective because recommendations can be discarded, and therefore 
government officials may be less accountable to the public’s desires.296 
Many jurisdictions employ the use of advisory committees in vari-
ous forms, and it is important to understand the context in which they 
were created, who appointed the members, and exactly what their 
charge or mission is.  For example, some committees may consist of a 
small group of people selected by public officials with unknown mo-
tives (e.g., they could have been selected for independent expertise or 
they could have been selected for more partisan reasons).  Advisory 
Committees may conduct deliberations in public or behind closed 
doors, and they may or may not seek to employ methods to engage 
broader public input to inform their deliberations or ultimate recom-
mendations.  One model is the Bethlehem New York 20/20 Advisory 
Committee (Advisory Committee) established by the Town Board in 
2008 for the purpose of providing the Town “with a vehicle to involve 
key community stakeholders and to stimulate a community-wide con-
versation about the long-term strategic direction of the Town gov-
ernment.”297  The mission of the Advisory Committee was to assist 
the Town in making key organizational and investment decisions to 
ensure that it maximized the potential to achieve the Comp Plan’s vi-
sion for 20/20.298  The Committee, appointed by the Town board, con-
sisted of about two dozen residents from different geographic areas of 
the Town, with different professional backgrounds and different in-
terests, who worked together to identify shared values and provide 
recommendations to the Town Board.299  Essentially, the Advisory 
Committee was focused on the long-term fiscal sustainability of the 
 
 295. THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO AD-
DRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 280, at 244. 
 296. Id. 
 297. TOWN BETHLEHEM, NY, http://www.townofbethlehem.org/pages/2020/adv202 
0.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. 
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community.300  Further, its goals were to cultivate community leader-
ship, identify issues and opportunities, build consensus, focus efforts, 
and guide decision making.301  To engage wider public input, the Ad-
visory Committee conducted a random, anonymous community sur-
vey in March of 2009.302  Through the study, the Advisory Committee 
learned that only “12% of a property owner’s annual property taxes 
support the many services provided by Town government.  This in-
cludes, among other things, highway maintenance, parks and recrea-
tion, police and public safety, senior services and operation of public 
water and sewer systems.”303  Within that context, the Advisory 
Committee made a series of recommendations regarding fiscal sus-
tainability for the Town, including economic development, and steps 
to encourage modernization of the functioning and operation of 
Town government.304 
D. Deliberative Polling 
Voters of the community are often unaware, overwhelmed, and un-
informed about the budgeting system of local governments.305  James 
S. Fishkin asserts that the Deliberative Polling method is an effective 
strategy that allows lay members of the public to participate in the 
creation of complex public policy.306  The process is designed to re-
place irrational, illogical and lackadaisical polling conducted by most 
institutions.307  Under the Deliberative Polling system, Fishkin asserts 
that the public’s views are more “rationalized and supported and per-
haps more consistent with other elements of the respondents’ belief 
 
 300. See generally Bethlehem 20/20 Advisory Committee Final Report, Executive 
Summary (2009), available at http://www.townofbethlehem.org/images/pageImages/2 
020/2020%20Final%20Report%20&%20Exec%20Summ%20June%2024,%202009.p
df [hereinafter 20/20 Executive Summary]. 
 301. See generally Town of Bethlehem, Preliminary Report of the 20/20 Advisory 
Committee, available at http://www.townofbethlehem.org/images/pageImages/2020/2 
020%20Preliminary%20Report%20Presentation%20051109.pdf. 
 302. A copy of the survey can be accessed at: http://www.townofbethlehem.org/ima 
ges/pageImages/2020/2009CommunitySurvey.pdf. 
 303. 20/20 Executive Summary, supra note 300, at 3. 
 304. See generally id. 
 305. James S. Fishkin, Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democra-
cy, CENTER FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/sum 
mary/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Fishkin, Deliberative Polling]. 
 306. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009). 
 307. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS 
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 83 (1991). 
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system.”308  The system seeks to poll how the public would vote if 
they were well informed.309 
Deliberative Polling involves taking a random selection of people 
from across the region to be polled by first taking a baseline poll to 
see how the public would vote without in-depth information on the 
subject matter.310  Then the sample group being polled is informed 
about the subject “with carefully balanced briefing materials, with in-
tensive discussions in small groups, and with the chance to question 
competing experts and politicians.”311  After informing the group and 
undergoing several face-to-face deliberations the group is polled in 
detail a second time, this time as informed voters.312  This deliberative 
poll represents an informed vote—how the public would vote after 
deliberating over the issues and becoming well-versed on the subject 
matter.313 Two essential aspects of the process are small-group delib-
erations that are followed by the opportunity to convene in a larger 
group to ask expert witnesses questions regarding the topic.314  The 
deliberations are most effective face-to-face, however, online meet-
ings have been successful in the past with the use of real time micro-
phones.315  Depending on the region, the average range for a subject 
group is 130 to 450 participants.316 
What’s Next California? is an initiative seeking to produce discus-
sions and ideas about government reform possibilities in California.317  
For two days in late June 2011, What’s Next California? administered 
a deliberative poll on the topic of government reform that involved 
412 people.318  Topics on which the group was polled included reform-
ing the legislature, reforming the initiative process, state and local re-
 
 308. Id. 
 309. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DE-
MOCRACY 162 (1995) [hereinafter, FISHKIN, THE VOICE]. 
 310. Fishkin, Deliberative Polling, supra note 305. 
 311. FISHKIN, THE VOICE, supra note 309, at 162. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. James Fishkin & Cynthia Farra, Deliberative Polling From Experiment to 
Community Resource, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES 
FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 73 (John Gastil 
& Peter Levine eds., 2005). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See What’s Next California?, Deliberative Poll, June 24–26, 2011, Poll Results 
1, available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/california/2011/nextca-results.pdf. 
 318. Id. at 2. 
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structuring, and tax and fiscal reforms.319  The results revealed that 
some of those polled had a change of opinion during the information-
al session prior to the deliberative poll.  There was larger support to 
refrain from decreasing the legislature’s authority and also to reform 
the initiative process to make the voters more informed on relevant 
issues.320  The results of the poll concerning state and local control 
showed a 6% increase of participants who support the idea of having 
the local government more in control of financing local programs.321  
There was, however, an increase in support after deliberation for al-
lowing the state to handle “important policy decisions.”322 Most inter-
esting was the approval and increase in support for transparency and 
accountability in the legislature for fiscal decisions.323  Further, after 
the discussion, those that participated supported the idea that the 
government should provide benefits and services, even if it may be 
coupled with tax increases.324  The deliberative polling experience in 
California was described as a success with 89% of the participants de-
scribing the program as “extremely valuable.”325 
E. On-line Dialogue 
Hampton, Virginia utilizes the internet for engaging public partici-
pation on matters of public policy, and more specifically the local 
budget.326  To engage the public, Hampton has created “Budget 
Week,” where residents gather to provide feedback to the local gov-
ernment concerning their attitudes toward the budget using polling 
technology and open meetings.327  In addition, small, informal group 
sessions allow the public to engage in more of an open dialogue.328  
 
 319. See generally id. 
 320. Id. at 3–4. 
 321. Id. at 5. 
 322. Id. at 6. 
 323. Id.  The forms of transparency and accountability that were supported were 
“[requiring] the legislature to indicate how the state will pay for any new programs or 
tax cuts it [proposes,]” and an increase in the “rainy day fund.” Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 8. 
 326. Office of Budget, Council’s Approved Budget for the City of Hampton, Vir-
ginia 23 (2011), CITY HAMPTON, http://www.hampton.gov/budget/pdf/11_budget/intro 
duction.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2011). 
 327. Citizens’ Ideas on Annual City Budget During “Budget Week,” CITY 
HAMPTON, http://www.hampton.gov/press_release/2010_budget_week.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 14, 2011).  The City of Hampton’s government has noted that “communi-
cating with citizens” is the highest priority when forming the budget. Id. 
 328. Id. 
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These events occurred at various times and places during February 
2010.329  To further this civic engagement, Hampton has created a Fa-
cebook page that allows community members to interact with each 
other and provide updates on city events and links to other govern-
mental entities.330  Most notably, the “I Value” tab on the Hampton 
Facebook page is a mechanism that allows Hampton residents to par-
ticipate in the budget process and budget discussions.331  One hundred 
people participated in budget week, and 985 participated in the online 
polling  The City published the results, allowing the community as a 
whole to view the input received.332  The City reported the results by 
identifying different services and showing what percentage of those 
polled would like particular services increased, maintained, reduced, 
or eliminated.333 
Online dialoguing can be an excellent resource for local govern-
ments to better understand their citizens.  Advantages of these meth-
ods include: 
(1) They are less formal than many other public involvement pro-
cesses, with adequate time for participation to understand others’ 
comments and make their case;  
(2) participants can join in at their convenience;  
(3) extensive resource materials are readily available and level the 
playing field by informing the public;  
(4) all participants, including policy makers, take part on an equal 
footing; and  
(5) the discussions are more deliberative, making for  more inter-
change among participants than mere testimony to policymakers.334 
 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Hampton Connects with Citizens through New Facebook Page, CITY 
HAMPTON, http://www.hampton.gov/press_release/hampton_facebook_page.html 
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 333. 2011 Budget Polling Results (2010), CITY HAMPTON, http://www.hampton.gov 
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Internet dialoguing, however, is not without its challenges.  While it 
can increase the number of people that can be reached, creating a 
more diverse dialoging body, it will leave out certain groups that are 
essential to the process.  Specifically, minority groups, tribal groups, 
low-income groups, and the younger generations, among others, may 
have their opinions misplaced by the process of online dialoging due 
to lack of internet access.335 
F. Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells 
In Denmark, “consensus conferences” are used where groups of 
the public participate in deliberations occurring over months.336  
While these groups make recommendations at the end of delibera-
tions, the reports will not always result in government policy.337  For a 
successful consensus conference, members of the public and govern-
ment policy makers must meet for a set number of days.338  First, the 
public learns about the topic to be deliberated, gaining enough infor-
mation for a meaningful deliberation.339  Then, towards the end of de-
liberations, members of the public compile a report of their recom-
mendations for the policy makers.340 
A similar system to consensus conferences has been used in Ger-
many where “planning cells” consist of small groups of the public who 
deliberate on public policy issues.341  Planning cells are most useful, 
“as a consultative body for administrative authorities in cases where 
different decisions are legally and politically possible.”342  Planning 
cells are structured by having hundreds of community members or-
ganize into different groups of about twenty-five, which then split into 
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smaller working groups for in-depth deliberations.343  Within the 
working groups, information is disseminated to the members.344  Once 
the informational sessions are complete, the conveners of the cells 
take all recommendations and create a report of all of the recom-
mendations, which is delivered to the policymakers and to the broad-
er public.345  The most significant aspect of planning cells is the small 
group deliberations, which give participants a greater chance to have 
their opinions heard in a meaningful way.346 
Critics of planning cells argue that they are inefficient for long-
term planning.347  This inefficiency results because the members of 
the planning cells are not charged with implementation of the deci-
sions and therefore do not consider the costs and work associated 
with implementation.348  As a result, the members may make deci-
sions that are not economically or physically possible when planning 
for the long term.349  This outcome poses a problem if planning cells 
are used in the budget process because during the budget process, 
long term goals and feasibility of projects must be considered.  Fur-
ther, “external legitimation” poses a problem because planning cells 
are merely consultants to the local governments.350  If the decision 
makers are a part of the planning cells process, however, then it is of-
ten hard to decipher between the decision and the decision making 
process.351  Other scholars have expressed concerns about having a 
biased planning cell; for example, “close ties to the state enable plan-
ning cells to directly influence policy, but on the other hand it makes 
them more vulnerable to the imperatives of the state.”352 
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G. Citizen Juries 
In 1993, during the Clinton Administration, the Jefferson Center 
conducted a citizen’s jury to examine the federal budget.353  “A citizen 
jury is a group of randomly selected people, gathered in such a way as 
to represent a microcosm of their community, who are paid to attend 
a series of meetings to learn about and discuss . . . a specific public 
policy issue and make public their conclusions.”354  The 1993 citizen 
jury was entitled America’s Tough Choices Citizens Jury on the Fed-
eral Budget and was a twenty-four person group that met for five 
days with the goal of jumpstarting the economy and implementing a 
budget that would produce long-term growth.355  The citizen jurors of-
ten expressed their appreciation of the Federal budget’s complexity 
and for the officials forced to make these budgetary decisions.  For 
example, one jury member who worked as a maintenance technician, 
stated, “I’m a lot more aware of how hard it is and I have more re-
spect for the people who have to do it.”356 
The facilitators asked the jury to “set high and low figures in each 
budget area, but they came up with exact figures that reflected their 
priorities.”357  In addition, the Center required the jury to address the 
following six specific questions: 
1. What are the most significant tough choices we face if America is 
to be strong and healthy in the 21st century? 
2. What potential sacrifices do we face?  Which sacrifices are you 
prepared to recommend?  Are these distributed equally over socie-
ty, or will some be asked to sacrifice more than others? 
3. What budget would you propose for the federal government?  If 
this differs significantly from what is proposed by President Clinton, 
explain where and why? 
 
 353. The Jefferson Center is a not for profit organization that facilitates the citizen 
jury process. See History, JEFFERSON CENTER, http://www.jefferson-center.org/index. 
asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={99A0A8C2-31B5-4823-8D86-D88E80836743} (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 354. Ned Crosby, Citizen Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental Ques-
tions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING 
MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, supra note 211, at 157. 
 355. The Jefferson Center, America’s Tough Choices: Citizens Jury on the Federal 
Budget 1 (1993), available at http://www.jefferson-center.org/vertical/Sites/%7BC735 
73A1-16DF-4030-99A5-8FCCA2F0BFED%7D/uploads/%7B7C4D1D0D-1C7B-48C 
9-98C8-7AAEC82567FD%7D.PDF [hereinafter America’s Tough Choices]. 
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4. What are the smallest and largest budgets (either in terms of rev-
enues and expenditures or deficit) you would propose?  Under what 
circumstances would you propose these and why? 
5. In light of what you have learned, do you think that President 
Clinton is asking too many sacrifices of the public, too few, or about 
the right amount?  Why? 
6. Is there anything additional that you would recommend to the 
President and Congress in terms of what is needed to make America 
strong and healthy in the 21st Century?  Do our problems rest mainly 
in deciding what will work, or mainly in making tough choices re-
garding options which are fairly clear?358 
Surprisingly, the jury of citizens decided to raise taxes.359  While 
noting that it was difficult to do, they found there was no way around 
it to maintain essential governmental services while working to im-
prove the deficit.360  The jury decided to cut the defense budget, phys-
ical infrastructure funding, social security, and other governmental 
services (e.g., agricultural subsidies).361  Newspapers that covered the 
citizen jury process weighed its successes.  Interestingly, one jury 
member stated, “[c]oming into this thing, I never thought I’d make a 
choice to raise taxes. But I decided to bite the bullet.  Our kids have 
to live with what we’ve done in this country.”362  One columnist sug-
gested that success was conditioned on whether the recommendations 
of raising taxes and cutting services would be accepted by the public 
as a whole.363  Members of Congress and budget decision makers in-
dicated they planned to use the recommendations in a meaningful 
way.  For example, Senator Pryor stated, “[t]his is a turning point be-
cause the political system is out of kilter and out of touch . . . .  If we 
don’t listen to what you say, we’ll be judged very harshly.”364  There-
fore, when elected representatives are the sponsors of a citizens jury, 
they are under a silent obligation to follow the recommendations 
wholeheartedly because if not, then they will be accountable in the 
upcoming elections.  On the other hand, one juror stated, in regards 
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to the budget “[w]e’ll stand behind you if you make the tough choic-
es.”365 
Literature suggests that juries should be kept to twenty-four people 
or less for a strong and meaningful deliberative process.366  Also, vital 
to the citizen jury process is having an official who convenes the jury 
and in turn will listen to the jury’s findings when creating public poli-
cy.367  Further, citizen juries require resources, both financial and hu-
man, to be effective.  Lastly, to be effective, the juror’s recommenda-
tions must be an important part of the local government’s decision 
making process.368 
H. New England Town Meetings 
To transform the status quo in local governments into a system that 
engages the public and is more participatory, institutional changes 
must occur.369  Local governments should consider modeling the tra-
ditional New England Town Meetings where face-to-face delibera-
tions and in-depth discussions can occur with policy makers and these 
“local assemblies should be vested with public power over local poli-
cies.”370 
To prompt this institutional change, AmericaSpeaks, a non-profit 
organization promoting a more participatory government, has 
brought back the notion of New England Town Meetings by helping 
governments form 21st Century Town Meetings and by guiding gov-
ernments in the implementation process.371  During these meetings, 
public opinion is the main concern and priority of the policy makers, 
thus creating a link between the public voice and the implementation 
of the newly adopted policy.372  Through its work, the organization 
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FECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 314, at 111, 
113. 
 367. Id. at 117. 
 368. Crosby, supra note 354, at 173. 
 369. See Fung, supra note 195, at 450. 
 370. Id. 
 371. About Us, AMERICASPEAKS, http://americaspeaks.org/about/ (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2011).  National Issues Forum is another organization that helps facilitate 
different processes that can bring people together to deliberate over public policy 
matters modeled after New England Town Meetings. See The Forums, NAT’L ISSUES 
F., http://www.nifi.org/forums/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). 
 372. Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer, Joe Goldman & Steven Brigham, A Town Meeting 
for the Twenty-First Century, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: 
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has found that “average citizens do have the ability to understand 
complex policy issues, make reasonable judgments about how to re-
solve them and commit to supporting the solution.”373 
A comprehensive outreach plan must be implemented to ensure 
that all members of the public who would like to participate have the 
opportunity to do so.374  As with all mechanisms for participatory 
governance, access to information on behalf of the participants is es-
sential.  AmericaSpeaks provides participants with guides that “are 
written to help people understand the context surrounding an issue 
and the diverse menu of options that policymakers are consider-
ing.”375 
In 1999, District of Columbia Mayor Anthony Williams conducted 
a 21st Century Town Meeting regarding the local government’s annual 
budget. 376  It was Williams’ idea to give the residents the opportunity 
to decide the financial future of their local government by deciding on 
which services and priorities the locality should focus.377  The com-
munity members at the town meeting sat in groups of ten around ta-
bles to discuss and review the governmental services on which the 
Mayor had to take action for the upcoming budget.378  The meeting 
included a fully diverse body of participants from all regions of the 
District of Columbia community.379  This town meeting was the first 
of the Mayor’s Neighborhood Action initiative to engage the public in 
the District of Columbia’s government.380  The purpose of the initia-
tive was to “engage[] District residents in creating the city’s budget 
and strategic plan, and hold[] the government accountable for re-
sponding.”381  During the third and final citizens summit in 2003, “par-
ticipants were asked to make budget trade-offs between the options.  
 
STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 
supra note 314, at 157. 
 373. About Us, AMERICASPEAKS, supra note 371.  Important to the functioning of 
the organization is its ability to maintain its neutral and non-partisan position during 
the meeting process.  By taking this position, AmericaSpeaks focuses only on provid-
ing facts to the public to conduct a balanced town meeting that permits all perspec-
tives to be discussed and deliberated. Id. 
 374. See Lukensmeyer et al., supra note 372, at 158. 
 375. Id. 
 376. See Reiss, supra note 230, at 338–39. 
 377. Lukensmeyer et al., supra note 372, at 154. 
 378. Id. at 154–55. 
 379. Id. at 155. 
 380. Executive Office of Neighborhood Action, Citizens Summit III: Real Chal-
lenges, Real Choices 1, available at http://rrc.dc.gov/rrc/cwp/view,a,1229,q,458860.asp. 
 381. Id. at 2. 
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Participants were asked to determine which options they would vote 
for given a budget of $60 million.”382  The community members were 
clear about their priorities.  Residents wanted to provide quality edu-
cation, make the neighborhood safer, expand health care for resi-
dents, and approach city initiatives in a more efficient and multi-
agency manner.383  Participants were polled as to what actions the 
government should take in regards to education, public safety, job 
opportunities, housing, and healthcare.384  The results show percent-
ages of what residents recommend as their first and second choices 
regarding what services the local government should act on to balance 
the budget.385 
On a more national scale, AmericaSpeaks helped organize a 21st 
Century Town Meeting in 2010 focusing on the federal budget enti-
tled, “Our Budget, Our Economy.”386  More than 3000 participants in 
nineteen communities across the country spent a Saturday deliberat-
ing over federal budget preferences and long-term effects, with the 
main question concerning how America should deal with the defi-
cit.387  AmericaSpeaks used various tools to evaluate the conferences 
including participant surveys, field reports, table key-pad responses, 
group surveys, elite opinions surveys, and census data.388  Members of 
the public were able to deliberate on budget trade-offs to reduce the 
deficit, and in the end one policy that accumulated a majority of rec-
ommendations was to raise property taxes.389 
According to AmericaSpeaks, participants overwhelmingly had a 
positive experience with the deliberations.390  Eighty-five percent of 
participants felt they became more informed about the budget con-
cerns and options for decreasing the deficit and 93% felt as though 
their voices were heard and other participants considered their 
 
 382. Executive Office of Neighborhood Action, Preliminary Report 3, available at 
http://rrc.dc.gov/rrc/lib/rrc/cs3/csiii_prelim_report4.pdf. 
 383. Executive Office of Neighborhood Action, Citizen Summit III: Real Chal-
lenges, Real Choices, Executive Summary & Data Analysis 3–4, available at 
http://rrc.dc.gov/rrc/lib/rrc/cs3/exec_sum.pdf. 
 384. Id. at 6–7. 
 385. See id. 
 386. Kevin Esterling, Archon Fung & Taeku Lee, The Difference That Delibera-
tion Makes: Evaluating the “Our Budget, Our Economy” Public Deliberation 1 
(2010), available at http://ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/AmericaSpeaks.pdf. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 4–6. 
 389. Id. at 12–14. 
 390. Id. at 42. 
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views.391  The participants worked together by setting aside their indi-
vidual political ideologies to work for the betterment of the federal 
budget.392  Therefore, the organization concluded that, “[p]ublic de-
liberation helps to reveal the considered opinions of citizens, a kind of 
opinion policy makers should care about as well.”393 
I. Initiative and Referenda 
Not viewed as a method of civil discourse, both initiative and refer-
enda merit discussion as they present a method for the public to 
communicate preferences on various issues, including fiscal or budget 
matters.  Using the initiative, in certain states, the public has the pow-
er to propose and enact legislation by popular vote.394  Further, an ini-
tiative can be used as a catalyst for a legislative vote to enact a law 
proposed by the voters.395  These actions can result in significant fiscal 
implications for the government.  By comparison, a referendum is a 
process that subjects proposed state legislation to the public vote for 
approval.396  In addition, a referendum can result in the public voting 
to repeal a current law.397 
In California, the concept of ballot box budgeting has sparked de-
bate.  California takes legislative actions and public initiatives con-
cerning the state budget to a vote for approval by the populace.398  
Some have noted that ballot budgeting is not the most effective way 
to create a balanced budget can lead to financial crisis: 
There are many causes of California’s current fiscal crisis—a global 
economic downturn, a tax structure which heavily relies on the 
state’s top wage earners; budgeting by initiative is just one factor 
among many. While we do not believe that budgeting by initiative 
alone has caused the current fiscal crisis, we do suggest voters should 
know the consequences of their ballot box decisions, such that 
measures which reduce revenue identify which programs will be cut, 
measures which call for new programs identify where the money for 
those programs will come from, and measures which call for the is-
 
 391. Id. at 42–43. 
 392. Id. at 45. 
 393. Id. at 46. 
 394. PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 11:3 (5th ed. 2011). 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Jessica A. Levinson & Robert M. Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: 
The Bane of the Golden State or an Over-Stated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L. 
Q. 689, 689 (2010). 
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suance of bonds identify the programs that will be cut or taxes that 
will be increased to pay for those bonds.399 
The initiative budget planning process has been criticized for lack-
ing a comprehensive view of the budget and not considering the 
budgetary consequences of decisions.400  The deliberative process is 
viewed as vital to budget planning because each decision made will 
have an effect on another public policy, and therefore, through delib-
eration and discussions, which occur during the legislative process, it 
is more likely that the effects of a proposed budget provision will be 
discovered, proving the ballot box budgeting system to be ineffi-
cient.401 
Aside from the lack of a deliberative process, other problems have 
been identified that preclude this as an effective way to engage the 
public in budget planning.  While the legislative process is prone to be 
influenced by strong lobbies or special interests groups, both initia-
tives and referenda are susceptible to the same influences.402  Another 
concern is the lack of informed voters who are deciding whether to 
advocate for a particular initiative or referendum.403  Further, critics 
note that not all voters registered actually vote, and therefore a budg-
et provision enacted by the public may not be representative of the 
entire public opinion.404 
In Hollywood, Florida, voters went to the polls to vote on a refer-
endum that would severely cut the pension plans of police, fire, and 
city employees.405  Local law allows such a referendum vote to go to 
the public when the municipality and the unions cannot agree on con-
tract terms.406  The voters approved the referendum, allowing the city 
to save $8.5 million and avoid major cuts in the upcoming budget.407  
The union, however, has vowed to fight the vote in court.408 
 
 399. Id. at 697–98. 
 400. Id. at 713–14. 
 401. Id. at 701. 
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CONCLUSION 
New York governments need to find a better way to effectively ed-
ucate the electorate about the critical and complex fiscal issues facing 
all levels of government, particularly local governments, whose fiscal 
health is tied to federal and state policies and resources.  As discussed 
in Part I, the morass of political players and policy issues, combined 
with constitutional and statutory legal issues, adds to the challenge of 
explaining a complete picture of the past, present, and future fiscal 
situation to average New Yorkers.  Yet, taxpayers deserve this expla-
nation in understandable formats, and they are entitled to contribute 
input to help shape present fiscal priorities and plan for the future fis-
cal health and service delivery at the local government level.  Utiliz-
ing one or more forms of deliberative democracy to engage the public 
has proven successful in communities across the nation and in other 
countries, and it deserves greater use in New York. 
Due to the diversity in population, perception of civic engagement, 
geography, economic climate, and the services required by a given lo-
cality’s infrastructure (city, town, or village), it is impossible to pre-
scribe a universal “best practice” model for public participation in the 
budgeting process from the discussion of the various models set forth 
in Part II.  It is clear from the results described, however, that any 
model deemed appropriate by the citizenry in a given locality can be 
highly effective.  Overall, each of these participation models brings 
transparency and accountability to the formulation of local budgets.  
Transparency is present as resident participants become educated in 
the budgeting process and create their own opinions as to how to pri-
oritize local budget items.  For example, residents may decide what 
services are necessary and cannot be cut.  Further, members of the 
public will be more aware of the amount of funding that each munici-
pality receives and exactly how that money is applied, making it much 
more difficult for “business as usual” with local government officials 
formulating the budget behind the closed eyes of the community.  
Likewise, greater accountability is established when a locality em-
ploys these deliberative democracy models because residents are 
more likely to pay attention to the final outcomes of government de-
cision making (e.g., voting on a final budget plan) when they have 
been directly engaged with the process.  Accountability takes many 
forms, but most effectively at the ballot box when constituents decide 
whether to retain elected officials based on their prior actions and de-
cisions, and in this case, specifically related to local fiscal issues.  
Therefore, elected officials who follow the collective advice gleaned 
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from a participatory budgeting process may be more likely to earn the 
support of the electorate, and those who choose alternative priorities 
after full and complete vetting through a deliberative democracy pub-
lic engagement process, may be more prone to expressions of public 
disapproval on Election Day. 
With the inherent diversity among the local governments in New 
York, ranging from one of the largest cities in the country to small ru-
ral Adirondack towns, it would be difficult to speak with specificity 
about the desired needs and priorities for each community when it 
comes to local government services and programs.  Civil discourse 
and other methods of deliberative democracy and participatory gov-
ernance, however, are essential strategies for re-engaging the public 
in critical public policy issues, which almost always revert back to bal-
ancing fiscal resources.  While many of the advisory boards, polling, 
and other participatory tools discussed in Part II can assist govern-
ments in making more widely acceptable fiscal decisions, to be suc-
cessful it is essential that participants represent the many different 
ways in which communities are diverse (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, 
age, geography, employment, et cetera).  It is evident from the case 
studies discussed that an informed and engaged electorate can under-
stand and work through the complexities of the fiscal morass con-
fronting local government and that through deliberative democracy 
strategies, the electorate can accomplish effective and meaningful 
change in government structures and government fiscal decision mak-
ing. 
